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NAFTA’S DOUBLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Juscelino F. Colares* 
John W. Bohn** 
Chapter 19 of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(‘‘NAFTA’’) replaced court review of U.S. antidumping and 
countervailing duties with binding review by special binational 
panels of trade ‘‘experts.’’  It requires these panels to apply the same 
standard of review that U.S. courts use in trade remedy cases.  
Despite the centrality of this requirement to the Chapter 19 panel 
system, these panels have not adhered to this mandate.  Chapter 19 
panels overturn U.S. agency rulings much more often than the 
courts.  In fact, they apply two different standards of review: 
exacting scrutiny where foreign producers and governments appeal, 
and near-absolute deference to agencies when U.S. industries 
appeal.  In contrast, panels have shown great deference to Canadian 
agency determinations (which almost invariably find dumping 
exists) and favor Canadian industries seeking duties as often as 
foreign producers seeking their reduction or elimination.  Previously 
suggested explanations-----that Chapter 19 appeals involve different 
facts, that U.S. courts are inept, or that U.S. industries have 
‘‘captured’’ U.S. agencies-----fail to explain these phenomena.  Rather, 
these discrepancies result from conflicting views about trade laws 
within the U.S. government, the relatively greater incentive of the 
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Canadian government to control the Chapter 19 process through 
panel appointments and political action, and a procedural structure 
that makes it easy for panelists to override the U.S. legislative 
process.  Proponents of free trade have, with some reason, warmly 
received Chapter 19.  These discrepancies, however, may reduce the 
credibility of international dispute settlement and impede 
negotiations of other agreements. 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States and Canada, like nearly every other 
industrialized nation, maintain ‘‘trade remedy’’ laws that authorize 
U.S. administrative agencies to impose duties on imported goods 
they find to be ‘‘dumped’’ or subsidized.1  Normally, agency decisions 
in such ‘‘trade remedy’’ cases can be challenged or appealed in the 
federal courts of each country.2  Chapter 19 of the Canada-United 
States Free Trade Agreement (‘‘CUSFTA’’), now the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (‘‘NAFTA’’),3 however, authorized a new type 
of review never previously employed: special binational panels 
 
 1. Part I infra discusses dumping, subsidization, and the operation of the 
antidumping (‘‘AD’’) and countervailing duty (‘‘CVD’’) laws.  We employ the term 
‘‘trade remedy cases’’ broadly to describe both administrative agency and 
subsequent appellate proceedings under an importing country’s AD or CVD 
statutes.  Generally, these statutes attempt to remedy the effects of certain 
trade practices of exporting country governments and/or private parties via the 
imposition of offsetting import duties.  Typically, in the United States, a 
manufacturer files a petition with the Department of Commerce (‘‘Commerce’’).  
19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(b) (CVD), 1673a(b) (AD) (2000).  The petition must claim 
that imports from another country have benefited from government subsidies or 
are being sold in the United States at prices lower than in their home market 
(dumping).  See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(b), 1673a(b).  After a brief preliminary 
inquiry into the sufficiency of the petition, Commerce then may choose to 
conduct an investigation to determine if the petitioner’s claims are valid.  19 
U.S.C. §§ 1671a(c), 1673a(c).  Concurrently, the U.S. International Trade 
Commission (‘‘ITC’’) investigates whether the U.S. domestic industry has 
suffered injury by reason of such imports.  19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b) (CVD), 
1673d(b) (AD).  If both agencies make affirmative determinations, then 
Commerce calculates an offsetting duty that will be applied against the 
offensive import.  19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(c) (CVD), 1673d(c) (AD).  As discussed 
infra Part I, Canada applies similar procedures. 
 2. See infra Part I. 
 3. Technically speaking, NAFTA did not terminate CUSFTA.  The latter 
remains in operation, as specified in North American Free Trade Agreement, 
U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 103(1), 32 I.L.M. 289, 297 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].  
However, CUSFTA provisions that are inconsistent with NAFTA are no longer 
in effect.  Id. art. 103(2).  For convenience, this Article will refer to NAFTA 
rather than the CUSFTA unless there is a particular need to distinguish the 
two. 
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appointed jointly by the governments involved to review agency 
decisions on trade remedy cases.4  NAFTA requires its members to 
obey the decisions of these panels and prohibits domestic judicial 
review once one of the members requests the formation of a panel.5  
At the same time, however, Chapter 19 requires these binational 
panels to review agency trade remedy determinations using the 
same standard of review and substantive law as would the domestic 
courts they replace.6  The U.S. and Canadian governments adopted 
this arrangement as a compromise, after the United States rejected 
Canada’s demands that the CUSFTA eliminate all antidumping and 
countervailing duties in trade between the two countries.7 
 
 4. See NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1904; Canada-United States Free-Trade 
Agreement, U.S.-Can., art. 1904, 27 I.L.M 293, 387 (1988) [hereinafter 
CUSFTA]. 
 5. See NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1904(1); CUSFTA, supra note 4, art.  
1904(1).  In both the United States and Canada, where an agency makes a 
determination following a trade remedy investigation, federal courts have 
jurisdiction to review the decision.  19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (2000); Special Import 
Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, Ch. S-15, § 76 (1985) [hereinafter SIMA]. 
 6. See NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1904(3); CUSFTA, supra note 4, art. 
1904(3)l; see also NAFTA, Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from 
Canada, at 6, USA-97-1904-03 (Jan. 20, 1999) (‘‘The NAFTA requires that this 
Panel apply the standard of review that a U.S. court would apply . . . .’’); 
NAFTA, Certain Concrete Panels, Reinforced with Fiberglass Mesh, Originating 
in or Exported from the United States of America and Produced by or on Behalf 
of Custom Building Products, Its Successors and Assigns, for Use or 
Consumption in the Province of British Columbia or Alberta, at 3, CDA-97-1904-
01 (Aug. 26, 1998) (‘‘The Panel’s role is to apply domestic law including relevant 
administrative law and act as Canadian courts would within the limits set by 
NAFTA.’’); S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Report of the Committee on the 
Judiciary [hereinafter S. Jud. Report] in North American Free Trade 
Agreement Implementation Act: Joint Report, S. Rep. No. 103-189, at 126 
(1993) [hereinafter S. Joint Rep.] (expressing the opinion that the inclusion of 
U.S. judges in the panel system ‘‘would diminish the possibility that panels and 
courts will develop distinct bodies of U.S. law’’); S. Comm. on Finance, Report of 
the Committee on Finance [hereinafter S. Finance Rep.] in S. Joint Rep., supra, 
at 41-42 (explaining that the requirement that ‘‘binational panels . . . apply the 
same standard of review and general legal principles that domestic courts’’ 
employ ‘‘is the foundation of the binational panel system’’). 
 7. See Michael Hart, Dumping and Free Trade Areas, in ANTIDUMPING 
LAW AND PRACTICE 326, 336-42 (John H. Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 
1989); Juscelino F. Colares, Alternative Methods of Appellate Review in Trade 
Remedy Cases: Examining Results of U.S. Judicial and NAFTA Binational 
Review of U.S. Agency Decisions from 1989 to 2005 2 (on review) (unpublished 
draft, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm? abstract_id=920144). 
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Prior studies of Chapter 19 agree that these panels overturn 
agency decisions more often than U.S. judges.8  One recent study has 
shown that NAFTA panel review not only changes duty rates more 
often than U.S. court review, but also that NAFTA panels are less 
likely to increase rates, or to sustain existing rates, than U.S. 
judges.9 
This Article reviews prior research and extends it by examining 
how NAFTA binational panels have examined particular claims 
advanced on appeal by U.S. industries seeking trade relief 
(petitioners) and by Canadian importers challenging duties 
(respondents), and compares the results of review of U.S. agency 
determinations with the Chapter 19 review of Canadian agency 
determinations.   It concludes that Chapter 19 panels are applying 
not one but two different standards of review, neither of them 
specified in the agreement: extremely strict review of U.S. agency 
decisions favorable to U.S. petitioners seeking trade relief and 
virtually total deference to U.S. agency decisions adverse to U.S. 
petitioners. 
Yet, even as binational panels systematically deviate from the 
standard of review in theory applicable to U.S. agency 
determinations, they have been quite deferential in their review of 
Canadian agency determinations.  This has considerably weakened 
U.S. industries’ ability and willingness to seek barriers to Canadian 
 
 8. See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-95-175BR, 
U.S-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO CONTROVERSY 
IN APPEALS OF TRADE REMEDY CASES TO BINATIONAL PANELS (1995) [hereinafter 
GAO REPORT]; JAMES R. CANNON, JR., RESOLVING DISPUTES UNDER NAFTA 
CHAPTER 19, chs. 13-14 (1994); Judith Goldstein, International Law and 
Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American ‘‘Unfair’’ Trade Laws, 50 
INT’L ORG. 541 (1996); Kent Jones, Does NAFTA Chapter 19 Make a Difference? 
Dispute Settlement and the Incentive Structure of U.S./Canada Unfair Trade 
Petitions, 18 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 145 (2000); Michael Krauss, The Record of 
the United States-Canada Binational Dispute Resolution Panels, 6 N.Y. INT’L L. 
REV. 85 (1993); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Binational Dispute Settlement Under 
Chapter 19 of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: An Interim 
Appraisal, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 269 (1991); Patrick Macrory, NAFTA 
Chapter 19: A Successful Experiment in International Trade Dispute Resolution, 
C.D. HOWE INST. COMMENT., Sept. 2002, at 1; John M. Mercury, Chapter 19 of the 
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement 1989-95: A Check on Administered 
Protection?, 15 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 525 (1995); Eric J. Pan, Assessing the 
NAFTA Chapter 19 Binational Panel System: An Experiment in International 
Adjudication, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 379 (1999); Jennifer Danner Riccardi, The 
Failure of Chapter 19 in Design and Practice: An Opportunity for Reform, 28 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 727 (2002). 
 9. Colares, supra note 7. 
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imports, while Canadian barriers to U.S. imports have been 
permitted or even encouraged. 
Part I briefly explains how trade cases operate in the United 
States and Canada10 and how Chapter 19 applies.  Part II examines 
how Chapter 19 panel review has affected the outcomes of 
antidumping (‘‘AD’’) and countervailing duty (‘‘CVD’’) proceedings by 
U.S. agencies, and Part III compares this with the treatment of 
Canadian AD and CVD determinations.  Part IV examines possible 
explanations for the observed disparities in outcomes.  It 
particularly considers three such explanations advanced in prior 
studies: (1) U.S. industries have sought proportionately more tariffs 
on imports from Canada than on imports from non-NAFTA 
members, or filed more appeals; (2) U.S. judges are inexperienced or 
incompetent; or (3) self-serving U.S. industries have ‘‘captured’’ U.S. 
agencies and courts.  It concludes that none of these explanations 
explains the observed outcomes.  Instead, it argues that a 
combination of ideological, national, and structural factors explain 
the different applications of standards of review. 
The Article does not attempt to resolve whether NAFTA panels’ 
divergence from the ostensible standard of review is desirable or 
undesirable.  Indeed, many U.S. trade experts consider it desirable 
because they argue that it reduces protectionism (at least on the 
U.S. side of the border).11  The Article concludes by suggesting 
possible reforms but argues that Chapter 19 panels’ failure or 
refusal12 to adhere to the NAFTA text may undermine the credibility 
of international dispute settlement in trade cases, thus impeding 
further development of other multilateral arrangements, such as the 
World Trade Organization (‘‘WTO’’) agreements, or the adoption of 
new mechanisms of dispute resolution. 
 
 10. This Article does not discuss the application of Chapter 19 to Mexico.  
This is partly because Mexico joined NAFTA only in 1995, so that there is less 
experience of the application of Chapter 19 review to Mexican decisions, and 
partly because Mexican practice of trade law is more distinct from Canadian 
and U.S. practice. 
 11. See, e.g., CANNON, supra note 8, at chs. 13-14; Goldstein, supra note 8, 
at 562; Jones, supra note 8, at 149-50; Krauss, supra note 8, at 91; Lowenfeld, 
supra note 8, at 334; Macrory, supra note 8, at 18-19; Mercury, supra note 8, at 
527-28; Pan, supra note 8, at 442-44. 
 12. The authors do not wish to suggest here that any particular panel has 
failed to adhere to the applicable standards.  Many have followed the relevant 
law.  This Article deals with aggregate outcomes.  Analysis of individual cases 
usually serves little purpose because individual published decisions are 
frequently susceptible to varying interpretations and the full factual record 
seldom exists. 
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I. OPERATION OF CHAPTER 19 
In both Canada and the United States, domestic producers of 
goods can petition their governments to impose antidumping or 
countervailing duties on imports of like products.13  Dumping may 
occur when a foreign producer sells a product below the producer’s 
sales price in the country of origin or below the foreign producer’s 
cost of production, suitably adjusted.14  Subsidies are countervailable 
if a foreign government provides grants, below-market rate loans, or 
other benefits to specific producers or industries.15  AD or CVDs can 
be imposed only if the dumped or subsidized imports materially 
injure or threaten injury to a domestic industry.16  In both countries, 
separate agencies investigate injury17 and dumping or 
subsidization.18  After they investigate, they issue ‘‘final 
determinations’’ regarding these issues.19  One comparative 
 
 13. U.S. Department of Commerce, An Introduction to U.S. Trade 
Remedies, http://ia.ita.doc.gov/intro/index.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2007) 
[hereinafter U.S. Trade Remedies]; Canada Border Services Agency, What  
You Should Know About Dumping and Subsidy Investigations, 
http://www.cbsa.gc.ca/sima/brochure-e.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2007) 
[hereinafter Canada Trade Investigations]. 
 14. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1677b(a)-(b) (2000); SIMA, supra note 5, §§ 3(1)(a), 
30; Canada Trade Investigations, supra note 13; U.S. Trade Remedies, supra 
note 13. 
 15. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)-(5A); SIMA, supra note 5, §§ 2 (definition of 
‘‘subsidy’’), 3(1)(b).  In theory, duties can also be imposed if establishment of a 
domestic industry is materially retarded, but this is rarely applied.  E.g., 19 
U.S.C. §§ 1671(a)(2)(B), 1673(2)(B). 
 16. Canada Trade Investigations, supra note 13; U.S. Trade Remedies, 
supra note 13.  There are some limited exceptions not relevant here.  19 U.S.C. 
§§ 1671, 1673. 
 17. In the United States, the ITC, and in Canada, the Canadian 
International Trade Tribunal (‘‘CITT’’).  See Canada Trade Investigations, supra 
note 13; U.S. Trade Remedies, supra note 13.  Prior to 2000, preliminary injury 
determinations in Canada were made by the Canada Customs and Revenue 
Agency, which also investigated subsidization and dumping.  See Chad P. Bown, 
Global Antidumping Database Version 1.0 19 (World Bank Policy Research, 
Working Paper No. 3737, 2005), available at http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbown/ 
global_ad/bown-global-ad-v1.0.pdf. 
 18. In the United States, the International Trade Administration of the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, and in Canada, the Canada Border Services 
Agency.  Bown, supra note 17, at 43; Canada Trade Investigations, supra note 
13.   
 19. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d.  They also issue preliminary rulings during the 
investigation, and may later conduct ‘‘administrative reviews,’’ ‘‘sunset reviews,’’ 
or other reviews or redeterminations of the amount of duties imposed.  E.g., 19 
U.S.C. § 1675; SIMA, supra note 5, §§ 56-57, 76.01-.03. 
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study has found little substantive difference between Canadian and 
U.S. AD investigation practices.20 
 Normally, any party involved, including the petitioning industry 
or importer, can appeal these decisions to the federal courts.  In the 
United States, appeals are first heard by the Court of International 
Trade (‘‘CIT’’), an Article III21 court with jurisdiction over customs 
matters.22  The CIT reviews agency final determinations to decide 
whether they are ‘‘unsupported by substantial evidence on the 
record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’’23  Appeals of CIT 
decisions go to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(‘‘CAFC’’), which has jurisdiction over various matters (e.g., patent 
cases) as well as customs appeals.24  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
discretion to review these CAFC decisions, but virtually never 
does.25 
In Canada, appeals of AD and CVD decisions are heard by the 
Federal Court of Appeal, which has jurisdiction to review decisions 
of federal boards, commissions, and other tribunals.26  It applies a 
spectrum of standards of review, ranging from correctness to 
 
 20. Peter Clark, A Comparison of the Antidumping Systems of Canada and 
the USA (May 1, 1996) (study prepared for Canadian Department of Finance), 
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/geograph/north/studant1.asp#upnote1. 
 21. Article III of the U.S. Constitution establishes federal courts whose 
judges are appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and serve for 
life terms.  U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.  Certain other inferior federal courts also 
exist, such as bankruptcy courts, whose judges have limited terms.  See U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8 (authorizing Congress to establish inferior federal courts). 
 22. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(1) (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (2000). 
 23. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i).  The ‘‘substantial evidence’’ standard ‘‘can 
be translated roughly to mean ‘is [the determination] unreasonable?’’’  Nippon 
Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (adopting test 
from SSIH Equip. SA v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365, 381 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (Nies, J., concurring)).  In deciding whether an agency’s decision is ‘‘not in 
accordance with law,’’ a court will provide some deference to the agency’s legal 
interpretations, upholding them unless they are ‘‘effectively precluded by the 
statute.’’  PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 928 F.2d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842-43 (1984)).  For certain relatively unusual types of appeal, the CIT 
applies an at least nominally more deferential standard of review, i.e., whether 
the agency decision is ‘‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law.’’  19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(A), (B)(ii). 
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a). 
 25. The last instance was Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443 
(1978).  
 26. See SIMA, supra note 5, §§ 62, 76; Federal Courts Act, R.S.C., Ch. F-7, 
§ 28(1) (1985).  In Canada, the CITT also acts as a sort of initial administrative 
appellate body, hearing appeals of certain dumping and subsidization decisions 
made by the Canada Border Services Agency.  See SIMA, supra note 5, § 61. 
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reasonableness to patent unreasonableness.27  Choice of which 
standard to apply depends on the particular situations presented.28 
Chapter 19 requires NAFTA members to replace their systems 
of judicial review of AD and CVD determinations with review by 
binational panels in cases involving imports from other NAFTA 
members.29  Each country retains its own CVD and AD law and 
precedents,30 but either government, or any person with a right to 
appeal to a local court, can demand that any appeal be heard by a 
binational panel instead.31 
A binational panel consists of five members, two appointed by 
the government of the importing country and two by the government 
of the exporting country.32  Normally, the governments are to 
appoint members from standing rosters of candidates, twenty-five 
appointed by each NAFTA member government.33  If the two 
governments cannot agree on the fifth member, they decide by lot 
which shall select a fifth candidate from the roster.34  As noted 
supra, the panels are supposed to apply the same standard of review 
 
 27. These were first recognized in Canada (Director of Investigation and 
Research) v. Southam, Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748 (Can.). 
 28. Which standard applies is based on a ‘‘pragmatic and functional 
analysis.’’  U.E.S., Local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048, 1088 (Can.).  
Courts consider four factors in selecting the standard to apply: the nature of the 
particular issue on which review is being sought, the expertise of the decision-
maker, legislative indicia (if any), and the overall statutory purpose.  
Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1988] 1 
S.C.R. 982, 1005-11 (Can.).  NAFTA panels at least have typically chosen to 
review CITT decisions under SIMA under a reasonableness or patently 
unreasonable standard, except questions of jurisdiction.  NAFTA, Certain 
Iodinated Contrast Media Used for Radiographic Imaging, Originating in or 
Exported from the United States of America (Including the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico), at 5, CDA-USA-2000-1904-01 (Jan. 8, 2003) (reviewing questions 
of law for reasonableness and fact for patent unreasonableness); see NAFTA, 
Certain Top-Mount Electric Refrigerators, Electric Household Dishwashers, and 
Gas or Electric Laundry Dryers, Originating in or Exported from the United 
States of America and Produced by, or on Behalf of White Consolidated 
Industries, Inc. and Whirlpool Corporation, Their Respective Affiliates, 
Successors, and Assigns, at 4-6, CDA-USA-2000-1904-03 (Apr. 15, 2002) 
(reviewing for reasonableness on issues of fact and law); NAFTA, Certain Hot-
Rolled Carbon Steel Plate, Originating in or Exported from Mexico, at 6, CDA-
97-1904-02 (Dec. 15, 1999) (reviewing jurisdiction for correctness). 
 29. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1904(1). 
 30. NAFTA, supra note 3, arts. 1902(1), 1904(2). 
 31. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1904(5).  Thus, if no party objects, it is 
possible to have a case involving a NAFTA member go to the federal court 
system instead of a Chapter 19 panel. 
 32. NAFTA, supra note 3, annex 1901.2(2). 
 33. NAFTA, supra note 3, annex 1901.2(1), (2). 
 34. NAFTA, supra note 3, annex 1901.2(3). 
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and substantive legal standards as would the courts of the country 
whose agency decision is being reviewed.35 
Chapter 19 provides that binational panel decisions bind the 
parties and cannot be appealed.36  NAFTA does allow governments 
to file an ‘‘extraordinary challenge’’ to a panel decision.37  Each 
government involved then appoints one member to a three-member 
extraordinary challenge committee (‘‘ECC’’), and the governments 
decide by lot which gets to choose a third member from a roster of 
present and former judges.38  Extraordinary challenge committees 
exist partly to ensure that NAFTA decisions remain consistent with 
domestic law and precedent,39 but are permitted only in relatively 
extreme circumstances.40  Only six extraordinary challenges have 
been completed-----all involved U.S. challenges, and each declined to 
overrule prior panels’ reversals of U.S. agency trade remedy 
determinations.41 
 
 35. See supra note 6. 
 36. NAFTA, supra note 3, arts. 1904(9), (11).  Both the United States and 
Canada have passed laws stripping their courts of jurisdiction of matters 
decided by panels.  19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(2) (2000); see SIMA, supra note 5,  
§ 77.11(6). 
 37. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1904(13). 
 38. NAFTA, supra note 3, annex 1904.13(1). 
 39. NAFTA, Pure Magnesium from Canada, at 8, ECC-2003-1904-01USA 
(Oct. 7, 2004) (noting that ECC should not permit ‘‘formation of two streams of 
anti-dumping and countervail duty law, one developed by binational panels and 
one by courts; a result that is clearly antithetical to the whole construct of 
Chapter 19’’); cf. NAFTA, Synthetic Baler Twine with a Knot Strength of 200 
Lbs or Less Originating in or Exported  from the United States, at 12, CDA-94-
1904-02 (Apr. 10, 1995) (noting that a binational panel should use the same 
standard of review as the Canadian federal court, even though binational 
panels are particularly expert in international law, to ensure ‘‘certainty, 
consistency, and predictability in decision-making’’ between decisions involving 
NAFTA and non-NAFTA members). 
 40. A government can file an extraordinary challenge if, for example, a 
panelist is guilty of ‘‘gross misconduct’’ or ‘‘the panel manifestly exceeded its 
powers, authority or jurisdiction . . . for example by failing to apply the 
appropriate standard of review,’’ but even then only if such an action 
‘‘materially affected the panel’s decision and threatens the integrity of the 
binational panel review process.’’  NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1904(13). 
 41. NAFTA, Certain Softwood Lumber Products From Canada, at 67-68, 
ECC-2004-1904-01USA (Aug. 10, 2005); NAFTA, Pure Magnesium from 
Canada, at 11, ECC-2003-1904-01USA (Oct. 5, 2004); NAFTA, Gray Portland 
Cement and Clinker from Mexico, at 7, ECC-2000-1904-01USA (Oct. 30, 2003); 
NAFTA, Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, at 52, ECC-94-1904-
01USA (Aug. 3, 1994); NAFTA, Live Swine from Canada, at 20, ECC-93-1904-
01USA (Apr. 8, 1993); NAFTA, Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork from Canada, at 
19, ECC-91-1904-01USA (June 14, 1991).  
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II. CHAPTER 19 BINATIONAL PANELS’ APPLICATION OF THE 
STANDARD OF REVIEW TO U.S. AGENCY DECISIONS 
Chapter 19 took effect on January 1, 1989.42  From that date 
through December 31, 2005, Chapter 19 panels completed forty-two 
reviews of U.S. agency trade decisions resulting in panel rulings.43  
Many previous studies have noted that Chapter 19 panels have 
reversed U.S. agency decisions more frequently than the U.S. 
courts.44  One statistical analysis of decisions through 2005 indicates 
at a ninety-nine percent confidence level that NAFTA binational 
panels are less likely to leave agency results unchanged than is U.S. 
court review.45  Of the forty-two completed Chapter 19 appeals of 
U.S. decisions, only fourteen ultimately left the agency’s finding 
unaffected.46  This indicates an affirmance rate of thiry-four percent, 
or about half of the affirmance rate of AD and CVD determinations 
by the courts.47  Chapter 19 affirmance rates are also quite low 
compared with the general pattern of federal court review of 
decisions of all U.S. agencies.48  The trade press has also recognized 
 
 42. CUSFTA, supra note 4, art. 2105. 
 43. The NAFTA secretariat publishes almost all dispositive panel decisions 
at NAFTA’s website, http://www.nafta-secalena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx? 
DetailID=380.  In addition to these forty-two reviews, another five cases 
resulted in published opinions after December 31, 2005, while other cases 
terminated without resulting in published decisions.  Id.  
 44. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 45. See Colares, supra note 7, at 26-28. 
 46. Appendix 2 lists the cases in which NAFTA review has left the agency’s 
finding unaffected. 
 47. Compare Colares, supra note 7, at 26 (identifying a sixty-eight percent 
affirmance rate of U.S. agency decisions) with Scott Graves & Paul Teske, State 
Supreme Courts and Judicial Review of Regulation, 66 ALB. L. REV. 857, 859-60 
(2003) (indicating that federal appellate and Supreme Court review of 
administrative decisions yielded affirmance rates of up to sixty-three percent). 
 48. One study found that agency determinations in the early post-Chevron 
period were affirmed in 76.7% of cases.  See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald 
Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative 
Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1008 (1991).  This figure excluded affirmances after 
remand.  In comparison, Chapter 19 binational panels affirmed without remand 
in only eight of the fourteen cases that ultimately left the agency’s decision 
unaffected.  This indicates an affirmance rate of less than twenty percent in 
terms comparable to the Schuck & Elliott study.  Another study of 105 reviews 
of EPA decisions, specifically under the arbitrary and capricious standard, 
found that the agency was reversed at least in part in twenty-two percent of 
cases.  Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron, State Farm, 
and EPA in the Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,371, 
10,392 (2001).  This ‘‘seems quite high in absolute terms.’’  Michael Herz, The 
Rehnquist Court and Administrative Law, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 297, 317 (2004).  
The reversal rate by NAFTA panels approximately equals the unusually high 
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that the level of deference is different.49 
These overall figures, however, conflate two diverse trends.  
Even though NAFTA panels reverse more often overall than the CIT 
and CAFC, Chapter 19 panels less often require rate increases than 
U.S. courts do.50  Petitioners succeeded in obtaining increased duty 
rates on review in only four cases, of which two produced mixed 
results.51  Furthermore, in the only two unmixed rate-increase 
 
levels seen during the Social Security Administration crisis of the early 1980s, a 
well-known episode when the agency allegedly defied the courts by illegally 
rejecting benefit applications.  Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Legislative Reform of 
Judicial Review of Agency Actions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1110, 1115 (1995). 
 49. See, e.g., Nancy E. Kelly, NAFTA’s New Resolution of Panel Offers 
Second Appeals Option, AM. METAL MARKET, May 21, 1996, at 14A, 15A 
(‘‘Canadians, pleased with the low margins [originally assigned by the agency], 
are happy to have the case heard before the CIT, which they view as more 
deferential to U.S. agencies.’’); Bernard Simon, Adaptability of NAFTA Disputes 
Procedure in Doubt: Mexico’s Legal System Could Hinder the Introduction of a 
Settlement Process, FIN. TIMES, June 15, 1992, at 4 (‘‘[P]anels generally examine 
arguments more carefully than domestic US [sic] trade tribunals.’’). 
 50. See Colares, supra note 7, at 17-18, 29. 
 51. By ‘‘mixed results,’’ we mean rates increased for some exporters and 
decreased for others after review.  The mixed-rate cases are NAFTA, Certain 
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Products from Canada, USA-93-1904-03 (Oct. 
31, 1994) (final AD determination) and NAFTA, Live Swine from Canada, USA-
94-1904-01 (May 30, 1995) (6th CVD administrative review).  In both of these 
cases, substantial victories by Canadian exporters had very small offsetting 
effects that favored U.S. domestic industry.  In Corrosion-Resistant Carbon 
Steel Flat Products, rates decreased for all respondents, except Dofasco.  
Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products and Certain Cut-to 
Length Carbon Steel Plate from Canada, 60 Fed. Reg. 49,582 (Sept. 26, 1995) 
(amended final determination of sales at less than fair value and AD orders).  In 
Live Swine, Canadian exporters prevailed on their appeal and obtained a de 
minimis CVD rate on one subclass of swine (all sows and boars) and on all 
swine produced by one company.  Live Swine from Canada, 60 Fed. Reg. 57,219, 
57,220 (Nov. 14, 1995) (amended final results of administrative review in 
accordance with decision on remand).  However, duties on other types of swine 
imports increased by 1/100 of a cent per kilogram, from 2.95 cents per kilogram 
to 2.96 cents per kilogram.  Id.; Live Swine from Canada, 59 Fed. Reg. 12,243 
(Mar. 16, 1994) (final results of CVD administrative review). 
One should note that in NAFTA, Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate 
from Canada, at 10, USA-93-1904-04 (Oct. 31, 1994) (final AD determination), 
the panel granted a motion by a Canadian party to correct a calculation error, 
which temporarily led to a slightly increased duty rate for one exporter, IPSCO, 
until the panel issued a final ruling which lowered IPSCO’s rate to a de minimis 
level, entitling it to a full refund and exemption from all duties and negating 
the temporarily increased rate.  Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat 
Products and Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Canada, 60 Fed. 
Reg. 49,582 (Sept. 26, 1995) (amended final AD determination); Certain Cut-to-
Length Carbon Steel Plate from Canada, 59 Fed. Reg. 15,373 (Apr. 1, 1994) 
(amended final AD determination). 
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cases,52 petitioners succeeded only because the agency decided that 
its own decision had been wrong and asked for a ‘‘voluntary 
remand.’’53 
In contrast, Chapter 19 panels were much more likely than the 
courts to cause rates to be reduced.  Twenty-five of forty-two cases-----
an absolute majority-----concluded with the AD or CVD duty rate 
being reduced, or an affirmative injury-related finding being 
overturned (which leads to the elimination of duties).54  In all, nine 
cases resulted in orders being revoked or duties being reduced to 
zero for at least some importers.55  In contrast, a study found that 
rates increased approximately half as often as they decreased in CIT 
review.56 
This suggests that Chapter 19 panels apply two different 
standards of review: a stricter standard than the courts employ 
when a respondent importer complains of agency action, and a 
standard that is extremely deferential to the agency when a U.S. 
industry petitioner argues that the agency has erred. 
The disparity is shown even more starkly by examining how 
Chapter 19 panels have addressed particular claims or legal 
arguments raised by petitioners or respondents.57  There is no 
 
 52. NAFTA, Porcelain-on-Steel Cookware from Mexico, USA-97-1904-07 
(Apr. 30, 1999) (9th AD administrative review); NAFTA, Replacement Parts for 
Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from Canada, USA-90-1904-01 
(May 24, 1991) (AD administrative review). 
 53. In some instances, after reviewing a claim by a respondent or 
petitioner, Commerce will agree that its final determination may have erred in 
some respect.  At that point, the court or panel is seized of jurisdiction over the 
proceeding, so Commerce cannot amend its determination.  See 19 U.S.C. § 
1516(a) (2000).  The agency must ask the court or panel for permission to revisit 
the issue.  The court or panel almost always grants the request.  This is more 
like an affirmance of an agency ruling than a reversal, as the agency has 
reconsidered its own position.  The rare instances where a court or panel rejects 
an agency’s request for a voluntary remand and instead affirms the agency’s 
original finding, e.g., Porcelain-on-Steel Cookware from Mexico, supra note 52, 
at 35-36, are more like reversals. 
 54. Among these, Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products 
from Canada, supra note 51, at 10-12, and Live Swine, supra note 51, at 21-22, 
concluded with mixed results.  See supra note 51.  Appendix 2, infra, lists the 
strictly rate-decrease cases. 
 55. See NAFTA database (on file with authors). 
 56. Colares, supra note 7, at 36 tbl.2. 
 57. Typically, each case that comes before a Chapter 19 panel involves a 
variety of claims relating to different issues.  Often, both sides appeal one or 
more aspects of the agency’s determination.  Examining how Chapter 19 panels 
have dealt with these individual claims provides a closer look at their 
application of the standard of review.  It also expands the data available for 
analysis, because a case need not have been completed to examine whether the 
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standard definition of a ‘‘claim,’’58 so exact quantification of outcomes 
is difficult, but an analysis of outcomes of different claims does 
reveal some striking trends.59  This analysis, if anything, may 
understate the disparity between treatment of petitioners’ and 
respondents’ claims.60 
 
Chapter 19 panel had remanded based on an individual claim.  As of August 
2006, there were five active Chapter 19 cases that had produced published 
opinions, along with forty-two completed cases, making a total of forty-seven 
available for analysis. 
 58. Chapter 19 rules require each person filing a complaint to specify the 
‘‘allegations of errors of facts or law.’’  NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1904 R. Proc. 
39(2)(b).  However, complaints are not published and many issues raised in the 
complaint are dropped or consolidated.  Panels often themselves provide a 
breakdown of the issues they will decide, or organize their decisions into 
separate sections for different claims.  These provided helpful guides.  However, 
not all panels used such an approach and they did not distinguish claims 
consistently. 
 59. This Article counts separately (1) each allegation that an agency erred 
in a way that could have changed the duty rate; (2) each challenge to the 
existence or non-existence of injury; and (3) each challenge to the scope of an 
order, whether restrictive (respondent) or expansive (petitioner).  It does not 
treat as a separate claim each legal or factual argument as to why a particular 
decision was erroneous.  For example, if a respondent claims that the ITC 
incorrectly decided that injury existed, that is counted as a single claim, even 
though typically there will be a variety of legal or factual arguments advanced 
to show why the injury determination was wrong.  Claims regarding admission 
of evidence or due process are included, but only if the disposition of the claim 
appears in a published panel decision.  To avoid double-counting, if a claim was 
renewed after an agency reached the same result on remand, it is not treated as 
a separate claim. 
 60. There are two main reasons for this.  First, if each individual argument 
were counted, the disparity between adjudications favorable to petitioners and 
respondents would seem much larger, because respondents’ claims are often 
decided favorably on multiple grounds, while virtually no Chapter 19 panel has 
ever decided any claim or issue favorably to petitioners. 
Second, it was not always possible to trace how Commerce resolved each 
individual claim after remand.  Until May 19, 1997, Commerce did not publish 
its remand redeterminations.  See Antidumping Duties; Countervailing Duties, 
62 Fed. Reg. 27,296, 27,330 (May 19, 1997) (noting that the public and even 
Commerce officials had difficulty accessing previous remand determinations).  
Even after Commerce commenced publication, it has often been difficult or even 
impossible to discern the fate of a particular claim after remand, as treatment 
of a particular issue may involve confidential data or be discussed in a separate 
unpublished decision memorandum.  For example, if a court or panel directs 
Commerce to account for a particular cost of production, Commerce may note 
that it has done this in its remand determination, but the calculations in which 
it implements the ruling may be inaccessible and it may not be possible to 
discern what effect, if any, the result had on the overall duty rate.  Thus, the 
analysis in this Article is based on whether a petitioner or respondent 
successfully persuaded the panel or court to remand a decision, not on whether 
each claim had an impact on the ultimate duty rate, scope, or injury finding 
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As of July 2005, there were five active Chapter 19 cases 
involving U.S. agency decisions that had produced published 
opinions, along with forty-one completed published cases, making a 
total of forty-six available for analysis.61  All told, the forty-six cases 
resulting in published Chapter 19 decisions involved 339 separate 
claims.62  Of these, 270 were by respondents,63 which led to 119 
involuntary remands and seventeen voluntary remands (i.e., the 
agency itself requested the remand).64  Petitioners made sixty-nine 
claims,65 of which sixteen resulted in voluntary remands, and only 
three in involuntary remands.66 
In other words, in only three instances in Chapter 19’s history 
have U.S. petitioners persuaded a Chapter 19 panel that an agency 
has made any material error that the agency had not itself 
admitted.  Another way of putting it is that of the more than eighty 
published Chapter 19 opinions reviewing U.S. agency action, 
totaling some 5000 pages, fewer than ten pages favorably dispose of 
petitioners’ claims against an agency. 
Furthermore, these three instances meant nothing.  Two came 
in one case, the CVD ‘‘sunset’’ review in Pure Magnesium and Alloy 
Magnesium from Canada.67  In a ‘‘sunset’’ review, the CVD rate 
calculated has no effect on the amount of duties collected (and 
arguably is a meaningless formality).68  In addition, although the 
 
after the appeal’s conclusion.  Again, this approach may understate the 
disparity between petitioner and respondent results because while petitioners 
did obtain some remands, they did not obtain any contested reversals. 
 61. NAFTA decisions are available at NAFTA’s Web site, http://www.nafta-
sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?DetailID=76. 
 62. See NAFTA database (on file with authors).  Note that one NAFTA 
decision did not produce a published opinion. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. 
 67. NAFTA, Pure Magnesium and Alloy Magnesium from Canada, USA-
CDA-00-1904-07 (Mar. 27, 2002). 
 68. The sunset review statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c) (2000), requires 
Commerce and the ITC to review AD and CVD orders every five years to 
determine whether revocation of the order would be likely to lead to 
‘‘continuation or recurrence’’ of material injury and dumping or subsidization.  
To do this, Commerce considers what rate of dumping or subsidization would be 
likely if the order were, hypothetically, to be revoked.  19 C.F.R. § 351.218(a) 
(2006).  If Commerce finds the rate would be zero or de minimis in such 
circumstances, it will revoke the order.  Id.  However, if it finds that 
subsidization or dumping would be likely to continue or recur at above de 
minimis rates, it does not revise the duty rate previously calculated in the 
investigation or administrative review.  See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(d)(2); 19 C.F.R. 
§§ 351.212, 351.218(a).  Rather, it merely reports the rate expected to occur to 
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panel ordered a remand on the petitioner’s two claims,69 the U.S. 
Department of Commerce (‘‘Commerce’’) then readopted its original 
result and the Chapter 19 panel affirmed it.70  Thus, nothing came of 
petitioner’s success. 
The other case in which petitioners won a claim was Certain 
Softwood Lumber Products from Canada.71  Commerce found that 
Canadian provincial and federal governments were subsidizing 
timber production, and both the petitioner and respondents 
appealed many aspects of the ruling.72  In the panel’s first opinion, 
the petitioner prevailed on one claim regarding Canadian log export 
restrictions.73  This led Commerce to substantially increase the 
calculated subsidy rate in its first remand decision.74  The panel 
subsequently held that the log export restrictions were not ‘‘specific’’ 
and hence not a countervailable subsidy.75  The order was revoked.76  
Again, petitioner’s temporary victory led nowhere. 
Overall, no petitioner has ever succeeded in having a U.S. 
agency determination overturned, even on a single claim, as a result 
of a Chapter 19 proceeding.  The disparity is particularly noticeable 
 
the ITC, which in theory considers it in making its own determination of 
whether injury would be likely to continue or recur.  See 19 C.F.R. 
§ 351.218(f)(3).  However, there is no reported case in which this rate played a 
significant role in the ITC’s determination. 
 69. The petitioner argued that Commerce had improperly failed to consider 
evidence of a new subsidy when it calculated the subsidization rate likely to 
continue or recur in the future, and that it had improperly reported to the ITC 
the higher CVD rate it had found in the investigation, rather than rates 
subsequently calculated in later administrative reviews.  NAFTA, Pure 
Magnesium and Alloy Magnesium from Canada, at 2-3, USA-CDA-00-1904-07 
(Mar. 27, 2002). 
 70. Pure Magnesium and Alloy Magnesium from Canada, 68 Fed. Reg. 
33,920, 33,921 (June 6, 2003) (redetermination pursuant to NAFTA panel 
remand) (reporting same rate to ITC as previously); Pure Magnesium from 
Canada, at 2-5, USA-CDA-00-1904-06 (Oct. 15, 2002) (review of remand 
redetermination). 
 71. NAFTA, Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, USA-92-
1904-01 (May 6, 1993).  This was Commerce’s third investigation of Canadian 
softwood lumber imports. 
 72. See id. at 1. 
 73. Petitioner claimed that Commerce had miscalculated the benefit from a 
subsidy involving log export restrictions.  NAFTA, Certain Softwood Lumber 
Products from Canada, at 122, USA-92-1904-01 (May 6, 1993). 
 74. NAFTA, Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, at 6, USA-
92-1904-01 (Dec. 17, 1993) (review of remand determination) (citing Dep’t of 
Commerce, Int’l Trade Admin., Determination Pursuant to Binational Panel 
Remand (Sept. 17, 1993)). 
 75. Id. at 76-77. 
 76. Id. at 8. 
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with respect to injury determinations: NAFTA panels have forced 
three ITC decisions involving Canada to go from affirmative to 
negative since NAFTA’s inception, something that U.S. courts have 
done only once, even though orders involving Canada are only a 
small fraction of the ITC’s case load.77  Appendix 1 provides a 
statistical analysis showing with a high degree of certainty that 
NAFTA panels are indeed less likely to favor petitioners’ claims 
than respondents’. 
III. CHAPTER 19 BINATIONAL PANELS’ APPLICATION OF THE 
STANDARD OF REVIEW TO CANADIAN AGENCY DECISIONS 
There have been far fewer Chapter 19 cases reviewing 
Canadian agency determinations regarding trade remedies, 
precluding statistical analysis, but some conclusions are possible.  
Of the twenty-four Chapter 19 reviews of Canadian duty decisions 
that resulted in published opinions, seventeen (or seventy-one 
percent) left the agency outcome unchanged.78  No agency ruling has 
been disturbed since 1998. 
In the seven cases where NAFTA review impacted the duty 
rate,79 the impact was as likely to be upwards as downwards.  In 
three cases, rates increased slightly.80  In two others, duties 
decreased slightly.81  In a sixth, previous deposits were refunded but 
 
 77. For example, of a total of 1887 published ITC decisions in the LEXIS 
ITC database between Jan. 1, 1989, and Dec. 31, 2006, mention AD or CVD, 
only 153 or 8.1 percent mentioned Canada, available at http://www.lexis.com 
(Legal > Area of Law By Topic > International Trade > Administrative 
Materials and Regulations > International Trade Commission Decisions). 
 78. See Appendix 2 (listing decisions). 
 79. See Appendix 2 (listing decisions). 
 80. NAFTA, Gypsum Board Originating in or Exported from the United 
States of America, CDA-93-1904-01 (Nov. 17, 1993) (increase in antidumping 
rate from 27.28% to 36.08%); NAFTA, Certain Machine Tufted Carpeting 
Originating or Exported from the United States of America, CDA-92-1904-01 
(May 19, 1993) (increase in antidumping rate from 11.97% to 13.23%); NAFTA, 
Certain Beer Originating or Exported from the United States of America by G. 
Heileman Brewing Company, Inc., Pabst Company, and the Stroh Brewery 
Company for Use or Consumption in the Province of British Columbia , CDA 91-
1904-01, (Aug. 6, 1992) (increase in average antidumping duties from 29.8% to 
30.0%). 
 81. NAFTA, Refined Sugar, Refined from Sugar Cane or Sugar Beets, in 
Granulated, Liquid and Powdered Form, Originating in or Exported from the 
United States of America, CDA-95-1904-04 (Oct. 9, 1996); Telephone interview 
with Karen Humphries, Trade Program Directorate, Canada Border Services 
Agency (July, 2006) (AD rate for one producer reduced from 79% to 78%, all 
others unchanged); NAFTA, Certain Cold-Rolled Steel Sheet Originating in or 
Exported from the United States of America, CDA-93-1904-08 (June 14, 1994); 
Telephone interview with Karen Humphries, Trade Program Directorate, 
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the government was allowed to maintain the duties prospectively,82 
and a seventh led to mixed results.83  Thus, Chapter 19 seldom 
disturbs Canadian agency decisions.  Moreover, even when it does 
so, it results in no major asymmetry between rate increases and rate 
decreases. 
Even fewer published Canadian appellate cases involving AD or 
CVDs exist.  In the Lexis Canadian International Trade reports 
database, covering decisions from 1989 through 2005, there are only 
twelve federal appellate or supreme court decisions addressing AD 
or CVDs.84  Of these, eight dismissed the appeal and four allowed 
it.85  Such reluctance to allow questioning of agency decisions 
highlights the high level of deference that Canadian courts extend to 
their agencies.86 
These limited data provide no reason to believe that Chapter 19 
panels have markedly departed from the standards of review 
applied by Canadian courts.  Yet, the small and symmetric impact of 
review on duty rates and the adherence to Canadian judicial 
standards contrast markedly with the extreme imbalance between 
rate increases and rate decreases that occurs with respect to 
Chapter 19’s review of U.S. agency decisions and the differences 
between Chapter 19 panel and U.S. court outcomes. 
IV. REASONS FOR DISPARITIES 
This Part examines possible explanations for these marked 
differences in outcomes between CIT and Chapter 19 reviews.  First, 
it examines three justifications commonly proposed by the 
literature: (1) that no real discrepancy exists because Chapter 19 
 
Canada Border Services Agency (July, 2006) (AD rate reduced from 8% to 7.4% 
on one plant and from 16.4% to 16.3% on another; weighted average 
unchanged). 
 82. NAFTA, Machine Tufted Carpeting Originating in or Exported from the 
United States of America, at 37-38, CDA 92-1904-02 (Apr. 7, 1993) (reversing a 
finding of actual injury, but sustaining a finding of threat of injury).  
 83. NAFTA, Certain Corrosion Resistant Steel Sheet Products Originating 
in or Exported from the United States of America, at 2, CDA-94-1904-03 (June 
23, 1995); Canada Border Service Agency, Remand Sheet: Certain Corrosion 
Resistant Steel Sheet from the United States of America (Aug. 4, 1995), 
http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima/anti-dumping/ad1014r-e.html (AD rate for one 
importer increased from 8.4% to 8.5%, while rate for another decreased from 
13.2% to 13.1%). 
 84. Available at www.lexis.com (Supreme Court of Canada; Federal Court 
Cases database; search (antidumping or countervailing duty)). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Accord GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 25 (‘‘Canadian Justice officials 
told [the GAO] that they believed Canadian judges deferred more to 
administrative authorities than their U.S. counterparts did.’’). 
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panels simply face different factual and legal circumstances; (2) that 
U.S. judges are inexperienced or inept; and (3) that Chapter 19 
panels are correcting bias in favor of U.S. producing industries, 
which have ‘‘captured’’ both the agencies and the courts.  It 
concludes that none of these explanations adequately explains the 
observed facts.  It then suggests that two other explanations better 
account for the different outcomes: first, that Chapter 19 panelists 
believe that U.S. unfair trade laws are bad public policy, and thus 
disregard the law and are more willing to apply their personal 
preferences than CIT judges; and second, that the Canadian 
government and producing industries have ‘‘captured’’ the Chapter 
19 process.  Furthermore, these tendencies are enabled by structural 
characteristics of Chapter 19 that make Chapter 19 panels more 
likely to pursue policy goals and less likely to adhere to written legal 
norms compared with judicial review. 
A. Justifications for Disparities Advanced by the Previous 
Literature 
1. Different Circumstances or Different Law 
Most commentators suggest that Chapter 19 panels apply 
thorough legal reasoning.87  Thus, any differences between Chapter 
19 and CIT review could simply reflect different circumstances and 
law. 
For example, if U.S. agencies impose duties disproportionately 
on NAFTA members, then Chapter 19 panels should overturn 
decisions more frequently.  The opposite is true, however: U.S. 
agencies have imposed fewer duties on NAFTA members, and U.S. 
industries have filed relatively fewer petitions regarding NAFTA 
members’ goods.88  A number of commentators have suggested that 
 
 87. E.g., Robert Cassidy, Dispute Resolution under NAFTA: A U.S. 
Perspective, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 147, 148 (1997); Mercury, supra note 8, at 527 
n.13, 596 (discussing a general consensus among commentators that FTA 
Chapter 19 panel decisions have been of high quality). 
 88. According to one strong supporter of Chapter 19, ‘‘Since the creation of 
the NAFTA, imports from Canada and Mexico have been subject to far fewer 
investigations and orders than imports from other parts of the world . . . .’’  
Macrory, supra note 8, at 2.  For example, from 1994 through May 2002, the 
United States entered seven times as many AD or CVD orders against imports 
from the European Union (‘‘EU’’) as from Canada, although import volumes 
from the EU were only fifteen percent greater.  Id. at 15 & tbl.1.  Those that do 
exist mostly originated before NAFTA, and involve low levels of duties and 
small volumes of trade (softwood lumber excepted).  Id. at 2.  Macrory notes 
that, even though Canada conducts far more trade with the United States than 
any other country, between 1994 and June 2002, the United States conducted 
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U.S. agencies in fact are more reluctant to impose duties, or impose 
lower duties, and more carefully justify them than in cases involving 
non-NAFTA countries.89 
Another possible argument-----that Chapter 19 panels appear 
more interventionist only because appeals of duty orders involving 
NAFTA members are rarer-----also works the other way.  Canadian 
appeals of U.S. decisions appear to be more frequent as a result of 
Chapter 19.90  In contrast, no U.S. industry has bothered to appeal 
 
thirteen investigations, resulting in only three orders, of which two involved 
softwood lumber.  Id. 
Similarly, Professor Jones compared the eight years before and after the 
CUSFTA and found that the number of AD petitions filed by U.S. industries 
against Canadian imports fell from an average of 2.8 per year to 1.6 per year, 
even while Canadian imports increased by five percent per year in real terms.  
Jones, supra note 8, at 148.  He also found that CVD filings fell, though not as 
much.  In Canada, annual AD filings against U.S. imports fell from an average 
of 5.75 per year in 1985-1988 to 3.6 per year from 1989-1997.  Id.  He also 
performed a regression analysis showing a strong negative correlation between 
the number of AD and CVD cases filed against Canada and the introduction of 
Chapter 19.  Id. at 153 tbl.3, 154-55, 154 tbl.4.  More precisely, he concludes 
that the introduction of Chapter 19 may not have deterred the filing of CVD 
cases as much as the demonstrated results of actual Chapter 19 decisions once 
those began to be released.  Id. at 154-55.  Thus, the propensity of Chapter 19 
panels to rule against U.S. CVD decisions may have caught U.S. petitioners 
somewhat by surprise. 
Professor Goldstein’s analysis confirms that the relative share of trade 
cases against Canadian imports decreased significantly after the CUSFTA took 
effect.  Goldstein, supra note 8, at 550-51.  She examined the number of AD 
cases issued against Canadian imports and compared it to the proportion that 
Canadian imports comprised of all U.S. imports.  This analysis would capture 
both any changes in the percentage of petitions filed and agency affirmative 
adjudications.  She found that in 1987, before the CUSFTA, the Canadian ratio 
of AD orders to its share of U.S. imports was 0.83, and this fell to 0.33 by the 
end of 1990, while AD orders against products from the European Community 
and Japan increased by this measure.  Id. at 551. 
 89. Goldstein, supra note 8, at 555; Macrory, supra note 8, at 4; Mercury, 
supra note 8, at 546; Arun Venkataraman, Note, Binational Panels and 
Multilateral Negotiations: A Two-Track Approach to Limiting Contingent 
Protection, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 533, 578-79 (1999).  As one observer has 
stated, ‘‘The Chapter 19 reversal of unfair trade decisions in cases brought 
before it has also possibly altered the way in which U.S. government agencies 
administer the trade law, in anticipation of a Chapter 19 review, and the 
expectations of potential petitioners regarding the outcome of cases.’’   Jones, 
supra note 8, at 150. 
 90. From 1989 through 2003 (the most recent year for which statistics are 
available) the U.S. government imposed 363 AD or CVD orders, of which 15 
were issued on imports from Canada.  INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, 
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ANTIDUMPING INVESTIGATIONS CASE ACTIVITY  
(JAN. 1, 1980 - DEC. 31, 2003), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats/ad-1980-2003.html; 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASE ACTIVITY (JAN. 1, 1980 - DEC. 31,  
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any negative final determination by U.S. agencies regarding 
Canadian goods since 1990, apparently considering such an appeal 
to be hopeless.91 
The greater deference shown to Canadian agency decisions 
could result from different legal standards of review.  Commentators 
often point out that Canadian courts themselves show greater 
deference to agency decisions than do U.S. courts.92  Yet, this does 
not explain why Chapter 19 panels generally adhered to the high 
level of deference that Canadian courts employ yet applied much 
less deference than U.S. courts under the U.S. substantial evidence 
standard and the Chevron canon.  One analysis of Chapter 19 
decisions found that they ‘‘meticulously surveyed and debated 
conflicting propositions that exist in United States administrative 
law jurisprudence’’ to justify an ‘‘exacting and unyielding approach 
to judicial review,’’ but that this same diligence ‘‘was notably absent 
from binational panel review of CITT determinations.’’ 93 
Moreover, there is relatively little Canadian case law reviewing 
unfair trade decisions, so there is little precedent to bind Chapter 19 
panels, and the standard of review of Canadian AD or CVD 
decisions has been quite uncertain at times during NAFTA’s 
lifespan.94  Panels can choose among a spectrum of different 
 
2003), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats/cvd-1980-2003.html; INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, AD/CVD INVESTIGATIONS FEDERAL 
REGISTER HISTORY, http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats/caselist.txt (last visited Aug. 8, 
2006); INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY INVESTIGATIONS: JAN. 01, 2000 TO 
CURRENT, http://ia.itc.doc.gov/stats/inv-initiations-2000-2005.html.  All orders 
on Canadian products were appealed at some time, although not  
every determination has been.  NAFTA SECRETARIAT, STATUS REPORT OF  
PANEL PROCEEDINGS, http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx? 
DetailID=10 (last visited Aug. 8, 2006). 
 91. E.g., Live Swine from Canada, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,400 (Apr. 19, 2005); 
Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination: Live Swine from Canada, 
70 Fed. Reg. 12,186 (Mar. 11, 2005); Durum and Hard Red Spring Wheat from 
Canada, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,707 (Oct. 23, 2003); Greenhouse Tomatoes from 
Canada, 67 Fed. Reg. 18,634 (Apr. 16, 2002); Final Negative Countervailing 
Duty Determination; Live Cattle from Canada, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,040 (Oct. 22, 
1999). 
 92. GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 25; Mercury, supra note 8, at 553. 
 93. Mercury, supra note 8, at 553. 
 94. Canada changed the standard of review applicable to agency decisions 
in 1994, when it deleted a ‘‘privative clause’’ in SIMA that stated that the 
CITT’s decisions were ‘‘final and conclusive.’’  NAFTA, Certain Prepared Baby 
Food Originating in or Exported from the United States of America, at 7-8, CDA-
USA-98-1904-01 (Nov. 17, 1999) (discussing the standard of review before the 
deletion of the privative clause).  This increased uncertainty regarding the 
amount of deference applicable to CITT determinations.  See NAFTA, Certain 
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standards of review based upon the facts before them and have 
chosen different standards at different times and applied these 
standards differently.95  Thus, binational panels could easily have 
reviewed Canadian trade cases more intrusively had they wished.96  
The critical question is why they did not. 
 
Top-Mount Electric Refrigerators, Electric Household Dishwashers, and Gas or 
Electric Laundry Dryers, Originating in or Exported from the United States of 
America and Produced by, or on Behalf of White Consolidated Industries, Inc. 
and Whirlpool Corporation, Their Respective Affiliates, Successors and Assigns, 
at 4, CDA-USA-2000-1904-03 (Apr. 15, 2002) (‘‘The level of deference to be 
shown to an administrative agency on questions of law within its jurisdiction 
has been the subject of much discussion both in Canadian courts and in the 
briefs filed . . . .’’); NAFTA, Certain Concrete Panels, Reinforced with Fiberglass 
Mesh, Originating in or Exported from the United States of America and 
Produced by or on Behalf of Custom Building Products, its Successors and 
Assigns, for Use or Consumption in the Province of British Columbia or Alberta, 
at 2, CDA-97-1904-01 (Aug. 26, 1998) (indicating that panel requested 
supplemental briefs from parties regarding standard of review following 
Supreme Court of Canada decision in Pasiechnyk v. Saskatchewan (Workers’ 
Compensation Board) [1997] 2 S.C.R. 890); NAFTA, Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon 
Steel Plate, Originating in or Exported from Mexico, at 8, 16, CDA-97-1904-02 
(May 19, 1999) (showing that the panel disagreed regarding application of 
standard of review following Pasiechnyk; majority accepted more lenient 
standard); NAFTA, Certain Prepared Baby Food Originating in or Exported 
From the United States of America, at 7-8, CDA-USA-98-1904-01 (Nov. 17, 
1999) (noting divided authority among Canadian appellate courts and 
binational panels regarding standard of review and disagreeing with majority 
in Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate case). 
 95. See NAFTA, Certain Top-Mount Electric Refrigerators, Electric 
Household Dishwashers, and Gas or Electric Laundry Dryers, Originating in or 
Exported from the United States of America and Produced by, or on Behalf of 
White Consolidated Industries, Inc. and Whirlpool Corporation, Their Respective 
Affiliates, Successors and Assigns, at 4-5, CDA-USA-2000-1904-03 (Apr. 15, 
2002). 
 96. For example, the removal of the ‘‘privative’’ clause compelling deference 
to CITT determinations could have provided an excuse to impose more exacting 
scrutiny.  See Mercury, supra note 8, at 557 (discussing that privative clause 
had been main reason for high level of deference).  Although most panels have 
applied the various standards of review unanimously, where differences have 
emerged, Canadian Chapter 19 panelists have been particularly desirous of 
lenient review of Canadian agency decisions and strict review of other nations’ 
decisions.  According to Mercury, in five of seven reviews of Canadian 
determinations that resulted in dissents, a U.S. panelist would have overturned 
the Canadian agency, while in the four reviews of U.S. determinations that 
resulted in dissents, the Canadian dissenter would have applied stricter review.  
Id. at 539-41.  In a more recent case, two Mexican Chapter 19 panelists sought 
to apply a more exacting standard of review to a Canadian injury decision, but 
the three Canadian members of the panel outvoted them.  NAFTA, Certain Hot-
Rolled Carbon Steel Plate, Originating in or Exported from Mexico, at 20-21, 37, 
CDA-97-1904-02  (Dec. 15, 1999).   
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Finally, there is a body of literature examining petitioner 
success rates in U.S. agency proceedings, seeking to identify 
variables correlated with chances of success.  Most have examined 
whether political factors influence agencies, with mixed results.97  
One recent study of U.S. sunset reviews found that while the ITC 
seemed to treat NAFTA members like other countries, NAFTA 
countries unexpectedly appeared to receive somewhat higher 
dumping margins (although this result was not statistically 
significant).98  Perhaps some unknown factor distinguishes cases 
involving Canada from others so that NAFTA panels reach greatly 
different results from the CIT simply because they are correcting for 
this factor.  To date, however, no one has suggested what this factor 
might be.  Until that occurs, it is impossible to prove its non-
existence. 
2. Inexperience or Ineptitude of U.S. Judges 
A second explanation often advanced is that the CIT and CAFC 
judges are inexperienced in trade law and thus cannot review the 
agencies as effectively as Chapter 19 panels, which consist of trade 
experts.99 
Again, however, the opposite is the case.  Both CIT and CAFC 
judges have extremely high levels of experience and qualifications.100  
Although some CIT and CAFC judges have taken office with no 
experience with AD or CVD law, they all work full time on 
specialized courts where AD or CVD cases are an important part of 
the docket, and quickly gain experience.  As the CAFC has stated, 
 
 97. See, e.g., Keith B. Anderson, Agency Discretion or Statutory Direction: 
Decision Making at the U.S. International Trade Commission, 36 J.L. & ECON. 
915, 928 (1993) (finding no evidence of political influence); Michael O. Moore, 
An Econometric Analysis of U.S. Antidumping Sunset Review Decisions, 142 
REV. WORLD ECON. 122, 140 n.13 (2006) (arguing that while agencies mostly 
follow their regulations, some political considerations may influence outcome).  
 98. Moore, supra note 97, at 140, 142 tbl.4. 
 99. See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 87, at 148 (‘‘[T]he panelists, by and large, 
know a great deal more about the law than do the judges who typically hear the 
cases.’’); Macrory, supra note 8, at 4 (finding that Canadian negotiators hoped 
that Chapter 19 panels ‘‘would be more alert to agency errors than the judges of 
the US [sic] reviewing courts, some of whom had had little more than a passing 
acquaintance with trade law before their appointment to the bench’’); Pan, 
supra note 8, at 391 (‘‘NAFTA binational panelists, like WTO panelists, have 
greater expertise than U.S. judges in international trade issues.’’). 
 100. Biographies of CIT judges are available at http://www.cit.uscourts.gov/ 
Judges/judges.htm and biographies of CAFC judges are available at 
http://www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.html.  Their high qualifications are not 
surprising, as federal judgeships are coveted jobs with unique lifetime tenure, 
extraordinary perquisites and benefits, and tremendous prestige. 
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‘‘judges of the Court of International Trade are experts in such 
[trade] cases, which form most of their docket . . . .’’101  Furthermore, 
they are assisted by full-time law clerks and do not face the same 
strict deadlines as Chapter 19 panels. 
In contrast, Chapter 19 panel members do not receive full-time 
salaries102 and must fit their binational panel duties in with their 
other jobs.  Their previous experience with AD or CVD law is quite 
mixed103-----many have none, and some have little time to develop any 
as they serve only one or two times.  Others have no legal training 
at all.  Very few have any prior judicial experience, and half are 
attempting to apply a foreign legal system.104 
Thus, the claim that CIT and Chapter 19 panel reviews produce 
different outcomes because CIT judges are incompetent has no basis.  
Furthermore, the implications of this theory are so far-reaching that 
they undermine its credibility.  The U.S. system of justice relies 
critically on tenured federal judges.  If they cannot review agency 
decisions as well as ad hoc panels of lawyers, academics, and others, 
the federal judicial system would need a dramatic overhaul. 
3. Bias or Capture of U.S. Agencies 
A third commonly advanced explanation for the different 
outcomes of CIT and Chapter 19 review is that U.S. agencies are 
‘‘biased’’ against importers.  This view is often advanced by U.S. 
 
 101. Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 
2006).  The CAFC describes itself as ‘‘generalist’’ court in contrast, with trade 
cases comprising six percent of its docket.  Id. 
 102. They receive C$800 per day for any time actually spent serving on 
panels.  North American Free Trade Agreement; Invitation for Applications for 
Inclusion on the Chapter 19 Roster, 69 Fed. Reg. 67,380, 67,381 (Nov. 17, 2004). 
 103. NAFTA panelist biographies are not published, but biographical 
information regarding potential panelists is often released to litigants or 
available on the Internet. 
 104. In fact, their lack of familiarity with the U.S. law-----particularly U.S. 
administrative law-----has been proposed as a contributing factor for the 
divergence between these two systems.  Malcolm Wilkey, a retired Chief Judge 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, former U.S. 
ambassador, and former member of a NAFTA extraordinary challenge 
committee (‘‘EEC’’), suggested that the NAFTA system is deficient because 
panelists are not attuned to the relationship between courts and administrative 
agencies in the U.S. system.  Judge Wilkey explained: 
Why do these distinguished Panel experts make this type of error?  
The answer is, I suggest, that they are experts in trade law; they are 
not experts in the field of judicial review of agency action; they do not 
necessarily have any familiarity whatsoever with the standards of 
judicial review under United States law. 
NAFTA, Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, at 64, ECC-94-1904-
01USA, (Aug. 3, 1994) (Wilkey, J., dissenting). 
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academics and think tanks.105  Generally, these theorists draw on a 
large body of theory proposing that regulated industries can 
‘‘capture’’ the agencies that regulate them.106  The basic theory 
suggests that large firms or concentrated industries have lower 
marginal costs of political action and higher marginal benefits than 
smaller or less concentrated firms, industries, or individual persons, 
and so can shape lawmaking or law administration to their 
advantage.107  For example, if an industry with a few U.S. 
manufacturers sells goods to consumers, the industrial producers 
have the resources and motivation to lobby to block imports.  The 
diverse consumers will have a ‘‘collective action’’ problem and so 
cannot organize as effectively.  The primary evidence that U.S. 
agencies have been captured, a study reports, is that Commerce 
finds that dumping exists in ninety-seven percent of its dumping 
investigations.108  This evidence is quite ambiguous, however,109 and 
 
 105. E.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 39; GARY HORLICK, WTO & NAFTA 
RULES AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON ANTIDUMPING, SUBSIDIES 
& OTHER MEASURES 15 (2003); Cassidy, supra note 87, at 148; Michael A. 
Lawrence, Bias in the International Trade Administration: The Need for 
Impartial Decisionmakers in United States Antidumping Proceedings, 26 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (1994); Rikard Lundberg, Deemed Liquidation: A Case for 
the Statutory Amendment of U.S. Customs Law Governing the Collection of 
Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 471, 485-86 n.82, 
527 (2005);  Michael O. Moore, Antidumping Reform in the United States-----A 
Faded Sunset, 33 J. WORLD TRADE 1, 2 (1999); Venkataraman, supra note 89, at 
553. 
 106. E.g., Goldstein, supra note 8, at 548. 
 107. Daniel P. Carpenter, Protection Without Capture: Product Approval by 
a Politically Responsive, Learning Regulator, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 613, 615 
(2004); see generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). 
 108. Lawrence, supra note 105, at 2. 
 109. There are several alternative explanations for the high level of 
affirmative dumping findings by U.S. and Canadian agencies.  Most 
fundamentally, a high percentage of affirmative findings may be consistent 
with the intent of Congress or Parliament, which enacted AD laws and 
exercises oversight of the relevant agencies.  In that event, as discussed below, 
the question of whether the agency is ‘‘biased’’ becomes a semantic one.  There 
are also technical explanations.  For example, the U.S. Commerce Department 
allows potential petitioners to ‘‘pre-screen’’ their petitions, i.e., submit their 
evidence privately to officials in an informal process before filing a petition.  
Many petitions are never filed as a result, while those that do proceed believe 
they have a strong likelihood of at least some success, so that losing cases do 
not appear in the statistics.  What this shows is that case selection pushes up 
the rate of affirmative AD determinations, making these statistics 
unrepresentative of the entire population of potential AD disputes.  See George 
L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 18 (1984).  Additionally, petitioners presumably do not file petitions 
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would also imply that Canadian agencies have been just as 
thoroughly captured by Canadian producers, as those agencies have 
found that dumping exists in virtually every case.110 
In any event, as an explanation for the behavior of Chapter 19 
panels, the agency bias argument has severe difficulties.  First, it 
does not explain why U.S. courts fail to correct this purported bias.  
Some have argued that the courts have been captured as well,111 but 
this seems hard to believe, given that both CIT and CAFC judges 
enjoy lifetime tenure and other institutional protections from 
 
unless they believe the marginal benefits exceed the marginal costs.  A positive 
but small AD duty of a few percent or a duty imposed on only a limited subset of 
foreign producers may provide little or no benefit to a petitioning industry 
because not all of the duty will translate into increases in prices or decreases in 
import volumes.  Rather, foreign producers may absorb duties, production may 
shift to countries or companies not subject to orders, or substitute products may 
be used.  Thus, depending on industry structure, filing a petition would make 
no sense unless the industry is highly confident of a substantial positive 
margin.  Filing a petition in itself imposes the burden of paying legal fees on 
respondents, but petitioners also must pay, and many are in financial distress 
by the time they have a reasonable case of injury. 
 110. See Canadian Border Services Agency, Historical Listing,  
http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima/historic-e.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2006) 
(providing outcomes of all Canadian investigations since implementation of 
SIMA in December 1, 1984) [hereinafter Canadian Case Historical Listing].  
Apparently, the only case in which no dumping was found for any importer was 
Outdoor Barbeques from China, although one source suggests dumping 
occurred in that case as well.  Compare Canadian Case Historical Listing, 
supra, (finding no dumping) with Bown, supra note 17, Canada Database 
(finding insignificant dumping).  Some investigations found no dumping with 
respect to certain producers, products, or countries, and investigations were 
terminated with no reported result, in some cases because evidence of dumping 
was lacking.  Bown, supra note 17, at 20 tbl.3.4.1, Canada Database.  The same 
was true of U.S. cases, however.  Id. at U.S. Database.  The CITT found no 
injury in forty-four of 149 investigations (or thirty percent).  Canadian Case 
Historical Listing, supra.  This is somewhat less than the ITC, which found no 
injury in thirty-three percent of cases.  Chad P. Bown et al., The Pattern of U.S. 
Antidumping: The Path from Initial Filing to WTO Dispute Settlement, 2 
WORLD TRADE REV. 349, 361 tbl.3 (2003). 
 111. Judith Goldstein, International Forces and Domestic Politics: Trade 
Policy and Institution Building in the United States, in SHAPED BY WAR AND 
TRADE: INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES ON AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 211, 
226 (Ira Katznelson & Martin Shefter eds., 2002); Krauss, supra note 8, at 91; 
Ann E. Penner, Why We Were Right and They Were Wrong: An Evaluation of 
Chapter 19 of the FTA and NAFTA 29 (Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade Staff Policy Paper SP78A, Sept. 1996) (‘‘They 
[Canadian negotiators] represented the appeals of Canadian exporters that the 
American process was biased in favour of producers from the United States.  
Foreign producers were unable to receive a fair hearing in the American process 
of judicial review.’’). 
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influence.112  If the courts have been captured but panels have not, 
then possibly the entire U.S. judicial system should be scrapped.  
Second, it fails to explain why, if U.S. producers can capture the 
federal judiciary, the ITC, and Commerce, they cannot also capture 
U.S. appointments to NAFTA panels.113  Third, it fails to explain 
 
 112. Like all Article III judges, CIT judges have lifetime tenure and 
guaranteed salaries under Article III of the Constitution, while an unusual 
statute restricts the number of CIT judges from any one political party, so 
capture of both political parties would be required.  U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 1; 28 
U.S.C. § 251(a) (2000).  Anyone hoping to capture the CIT would also have to 
capture the judges of the CAFC as well.  This would present its own difficulties, 
as review of trade law decisions is a smaller part of the CAFC docket than 
review of other cases, such as patent decisions and claims against the U.S. 
government.  Thus, appointments to this court would tend to be made based 
upon considerations other than just views on trade laws, one way or another. 
Professor Krauss argues that ‘‘even independent members of the judiciary 
tend to be products of the local practicing bar and are subject to professional 
and political pressures of which few arguably emanate from foreign producers 
(for reasons of dispersion of interests) or the mass of domestic consumers.’’  
Krauss, supra note 8, at 91.  Yet, if U.S. producing industries can capture not 
only U.S. judges, but also the U.S. bar, then by the same mechanism they would 
have captured U.S. Chapter 19 panel appointees, virtually all of whom are 
lawyers.  Cf. NAFTA, supra note 3, annex 1901.2(2) (requiring a majority of 
panelists to be lawyers in good standing).  Additionally, there are far more 
practicing trade lawyers representing foreign producers, importers, foreign 
governments, and consuming industries than representing petitioning U.S. 
industries, if only because each trade case typically involves a single petitioner 
counsel while each individual respondent is represented separately.  For 
example, in the softwood lumber cases, a single law firm represented U.S. 
petitioners, while over forty law firms represented the various Canadian federal 
and provincial governments, industry associations, and individual respondents. 
 113. The United States Trade Representative (‘‘USTR’’), a Presidential 
appointee, appoints NAFTA panel members, but the President potentially has 
at least as much influence over the behavior of the agencies administering the 
trade laws.  The President appoints all the decisionmakers in charge of 
investigating and deciding upon AD or CVD duty rates, subject to confirmation 
by the Senate.  The Secretary of Commerce investigates and determines AD and 
CVD rates, while the ITC investigates and determines injury.  19 U.S.C. §§ 
1671(a), 1673, 1677(1)-(2) (2000).  Unpublished internal Commerce 
organizational orders delegate the Commerce Secretary’s authority to the 
Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade, who in turn has 
delegated decisionmaking authority in AD or CVD investigations to the 
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Import Administration.  See NEC Corp. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 978 F. Supp. 314, 319 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1997), aff’d, 151 
F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (describing working of Department of Commerce 
Organization Order 10-3 and Department of Commerce Organization and 
Function Order 41-1).  The Under Secretary retains authority to make general 
policies regarding operation of the AD or CVD laws, but is not supposed to have 
any involvement in investigations or specific AD or CVD decisions.  See id.  ITC 
commissioners have nine-year fixed, non-renewable terms, 19 U.S.C. § 1330(b) 
(2000), but the President can remove at will the assistant secretary in charge of 
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why NAFTA panels seek to reverse the claimed capture of U.S. 
agencies, but not equivalent capture of Canadian agencies. 
Fourth, capture theory postulates that regulated agencies 
capture their regulators, but the AD and CVD laws regulate 
importers, not U.S. industry.114  Thus, at a minimum, capture theory 
would suggest that importers have the greatest motivation to 
capture the relevant agencies.115  Fifth, others have suggested that 
the U.S. AD and CVD laws may reflect the actual preferences of a 
majority of U.S. citizens, who do not favor free trade as much as the 
policymaking elites do.116  If so, then agency actions cannot be said to 
reflect capture so much as democratic decisionmaking.117 
B. More Plausible Alternative Explanations for Differing NAFTA 
Standards of Review 
1. Institutional Preferences 
Professor Goldstein has suggested another model, based on 
presumed differences in preferences between the U.S. Congress and 
President.118  She postulates that (1) the U.S. Congress is relatively 
 
Import Administration and the Under Secretary in charge of AD or CVD policy.  
Political appointees seek promotion to other political appointments, and so have 
every incentive to conform to White House desires.  Lower-level bureaucrats 
enjoy civil service protection, but the executive branch controls promotion and 
transfers. 
 114. Not only that, but a U.S. industry seeking to show injury must 
establish that it has encountered some degree of hardship, so it has depleted 
resources, while foreign importers enjoy the unqualified support of their own 
government.  Many investigations of Canadian goods involve basic or 
intermediate commodities, like pork or certain types of steel, in which the 
downstream U.S. consuming industry may be as, or more, concentrated than 
the U.S. producers seeking trade barriers.  According to some theories, these 
industries should be better able to mobilize political resources to pressure the 
U.S. agencies against imposing offsetting duties. 
 115. As noted supra note 109, the costs that duties impose on importers and 
foreign producers of goods may exceed the benefits that domestic producers 
derive from them, so that the former have a greater incentive to invest in 
political action. 
 116. See generally Chantal Thomas, Challenges for Democracy and Trade: 
The Case of the United States, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2004). 
 117. As the CIT has stated: 
A general allegation of bias in favor of a domestic manufacturer could 
probably be made in all dumping investigations; this is simply a 
consequence of enforcing laws intended to remedy the injury caused 
by less than fair value imports. The fact that domestic manufacturers 
stand to benefit from the imposition of antidumping duty orders does 
not render Commerce incapable of conducting investigations. 
NEC Corp., 978 F. Supp. at 327 n.90. 
 118. Goldstein, supra note 8, at 548-49, 556-57. 
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sympathetic to duties, while the President attempts to advance the 
‘‘national interest’’ by promoting a free trade regime; and (2) 
appointed bodies like the courts and NAFTA tribunals typically 
reflect the interests of those entities that appointed or confirmed 
them.119 
Thus, she suggests that U.S. agencies would like to impose high 
tariffs, but the CIT will tolerate only lower duties because judges’ 
preferences more closely reflect the President’s.120  NAFTA panels 
will accept only duties that are lower still because their preferences 
reflect a combination of the Canadian government’s and the U.S. 
President’s.121  She illustrates the choices as follows: 122 
 
Chart 1: Preferences Regarding U.S. AD/CVD Duties 
 
Trade Agencies                   Congress       CIT          Pres.           Ch. 19 Panel        
←⎯⎯|⎯⎯⎯⎯X⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯|⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯|⎯⎯⎯⎯Y⎯⎯|⎯⎯⎯|⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯| 
Higher Duty   Outcome with CIT review   Outcome with Ch. 19 review  No Duty 
 The outcomes under CIT review are depicted by X on the 
diagram-----a compromise between the agency’s desired rate and the 
CIT’s-----while the outcomes under Chapter 19 review are depicted by 
point Y.123 
 
 119. Id. at 548-49. 
 120. Id. 
 121. The USTR appoints all U.S. representatives on Chapter 19 rosters and 
panels.  19 U.S.C. § 3432(d)(1) (2000).  The USTR must consult with Congress 
before appointing persons to rosters, but Congress has no veto power over roster 
membership and no role in selecting panel members.  19 U.S.C. § 3432(b)(3) & 
(c)(3)-(4). 
 122. Goldstein, supra note 8, at 548.  Chart 1 is simplified from Professor 
Goldstein’s original.  In Chart 1, the duty rate preferred by each institution is 
noted as a vertical line below that institution’s name. 
 123. In this model, if the agency knows that the CIT will review its decision, 
it will select X.  Point X lies marginally closer to the CIT’s preferred duty rate 
than a zero duty would be.  That is, given a choice between X and no duty at all, 
the CIT would prefer X.  So, the court would presumably affirm a duty at point 
X if it must choose between allowing the agency’s ruling to stand or ordering 
the agency to eliminate duties altogether.  Similarly, at point Y, the rate 
selected is closer to the Chapter 19 panel’s preference than no duty at all 
(although still above the panel’s preference), so the panel will tolerate it. 
This model assumes that appellate review is ‘‘all or nothing.’’  This is often 
true of ITC decisions, but courts and Chapter 19 panels can use partial remands 
of AD or CVD rate decisions to move duties closer to the courts’ desired levels, 
without reversing the orders entirely.  Thus, if courts or Chapter 19 panels 
consider only their own preferences, one would expect to see them using partial 
remands to ensure ultimate outcomes more or less coincide with their own 
preferences, not the agency’s.  That indeed appears to occur in the case of 
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This model is consistent with the observations supra that 
Chapter 19 review results in lower duties than CIT review (which 
tends to reduce duties to a lesser extent), and that U.S. agencies 
tend to impose lower duty rates in petitions involving Canada than 
in cases involving other countries. 
 This model also implies124 that the review standards applied by 
Chapter 19 panels, on average, are not consistent with U.S. law and 
differ from the standard applied by the U.S. courts.  U.S. law gives 
the ITC and the Commerce Department considerable discretion and 
requires the courts to provide them considerable deference.125  Thus, 
these agencies have some latitude to select methodologies that may 
result in duty rates above those that Congress, in the abstract, 
might have preferred.  By imposing duty rates lower than Congress 
might have chosen, the Chapter 19 panels effectively divest the 
agencies of their discretion, as illustrated below. 
 
Chart 2: Agency Zone of Discretion 
 
                              ⎯⎯⎯ zone of discretion ⎯⎯ 
Trade Agencies                      Congress       CIT         Pres.           Ch. 19 Panel        
←⎯⎯|⎯⎯⎯⎯X⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯|⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯|⎯⎯⎯Y⎯⎯|⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯|⎯⎯⎯⎯| 
Higher Duty   Outcome with CIT review    Outcome with Ch. 19 review  No Duty 
 
As long as the agency selects an outcome that falls within this 
vaguely defined zone of discretion, even if above congressional 
 
Chapter 19 review, as Chapter 19 panels usually overturn a U.S. agency’s 
decision, almost always to reduce the duty further or eliminate it entirely.  
Accordingly, if the CIT or Chapter 19 panels paid no deference at all to agency 
decisions, observed outcomes would fall on the vertical lines below ‘‘CIT’’ and 
‘‘Ch. 19 Panel’’ respectively. 
 124. The authors are reading this conclusion into the model and do not 
intend in any way to attribute it to Professor Goldstein. 
 125. See, e.g., Thai Pineapple Pub. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1362, 
1365-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that ‘‘[a]ntidumping investigations are complex 
and complicated matters in which Commerce has particular expertise’’ and that 
the Department ‘‘is the ‘master of the antidumping law,’ and reviewing courts 
must accord deference to the agency in its selection and development of proper 
methodologies’’); Smith-Corona Group v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568, 1582 
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that the antidumping statute ‘‘reveals tremendous 
deference to the expertise of the [Department] in administering the 
antidumping law’’); Tehnoimportexport, UCF America Inc. v. United States, 783 
F. Supp. 1401, 1404 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1992) (‘‘[T]he ‘court may not substitute its 
judgment for that of the [agency] when the choice is ‘‘between two fairly 
conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different 
choice had the matter been before it de novo.’’’) (quoting American Spring Wire 
Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1273, 1276 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1984)). 
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intent, U.S. law prohibits a court from interfering, still less from 
imposing a result below congressional intent or outside of the zone 
of discretion.126 
This model might also shed some light on Chapter 19 panels’ 
different treatment of U.S. and Canadian agencies.  Canada has a 
parliamentary system with no nationally elected executive.  Thus, 
possibly, its government and hence its NAFTA appointees could be 
more protectionist as far as Canadian imports are concerned, while 
being eager to eliminate U.S. trade barriers.127 
2. Different Governmental Levels of Motivation 
A second alternative explanation for the disparities involves the 
differences in motivations between the U.S. and Canadian 
governments.  As described supra, powerful and well-integrated 
players with a relatively greater stake in the outcome of a 
regulatory process can exert a disproportionate influence on it.  In 
the context of Chapter 19, that gives the Canadian government (and 
Canadian exporters and producers) more influence over the process 
and outcomes than the U.S. government or U.S. industry. 
When it comes to cross-border trade disputes, the Canadian 
government has vastly greater resources than any U.S. industry and 
much greater motivation to act than the U.S. government.  Canada 
has the ninth largest GDP of any country in the world at C$1.37 
trillion.128  Its government has a budget of some C$196 billion;129 
 
 126. Note that there could be some deviation between the intent of the 
Congress that enacted the law and a subsequent Congress that appointed the 
CIT judges and confirmed Commerce and ITC officials.  If Congress became 
vastly more protectionist after enacting the CUSFTA, then, in theory, point Y 
could eventually move to the left of the agency’s legitimate zone of discretion 
around the original Congressional intent so that a Chapter 19 panel would be 
legally justified in imposing results further to the right.  But such an enormous 
shift would not be consistent with the subsequent extension of the CUSFTA to 
NAFTA or implementation of the WTO agreements, and a political upheaval of 
such scale would presumably also impact the President and, through him, 
appointments to Chapter 19 panels themselves. 
 127. This would not explain why U.S. Chapter 19 appointees would 
acquiesce in such decisions, but possibly U.S. panelists’ relative ignorance of 
Canadian law makes them unable to effectively influence decisions in cases 
involving Canadian agency actions.  In the authors’ experience, U.S. lawyers 
tend to know less about Canadian law than Canadian lawyers know about U.S. 
law.  Though not supported by scientific evidence, this would not be surprising 
given that the U.S. economy has a greater influence on Canada’s economy than 
vice versa. 
 128. Statistics Canada, Gross Domestic Product, Income-Based (2005  
data), http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/index.htm (search ‘‘Summary tables’’ 
for ‘‘gross domestic product;’’ select ‘‘7. Gross domestic product, income based’’) 
[hereinafter StatsCan GDP data]; see also World Bank, Total  
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membership in NATO, the United Nations, the G-7, the WTO, and 
numerous other international organizations; and an embassy and 
network of twenty-one consulates in the United States.130  It uses 
these levers to promote its exports and employs numerous law firms, 
lobbyists, and public relations consultants on trade issues in the 
United States.  Although it is much smaller than the United States 
in terms of population and national income, trade with the United 
States plays a far greater role in Canadian politics than U.S. trade 
with Canada plays in U.S. politics.  Canada’s exports to the United 
States account for C$369 billion, or 81% of the country’s total 
exports and 27% of its GDP.131  U.S. exports to Canada were US$212 
billion in 2005, or just 1.7% of the U.S. GDP in 2005 of US$12.5 
trillion-----about 1/15 the proportionate share of economic activity.132  
Canada consistently maintains a large and growing trade surplus 
with the United States.133 
Possibly no economic or foreign policy issue exceeds trade with 
the United States in political importance in Canada.  In contrast, 
although the passage of the CUSFTA and NAFTA were important 
trade priorities of Presidents Reagan and Clinton, the ongoing 
administration of trade with Canada is not even a top foreign policy 
priority of the U.S. President, let alone a top political priority. 
 
GDP 2005, http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP& 
CCODE=CAN. 
 129. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CANADA, FISCAL REFERENCE TABLES 15 tbl.7 
(2005), http://www.fin.gc.ca/frt/2005/frt05_e.pdf. 
 130. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canadian 
Government Offices in the U.S., http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canam/ 
washington/offices/default-en.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2007). 
 131. StatsCan GDP data, supra note 128; Statistics Canada, Imports, 
Exports, and Trade Balance of Goods on a Balance-of-Payments Basis, by 
Country or Country Grouping (2005 data), http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/ 
Gblec02a.htm [hereinafter StatsCan Trade Balance data]. 
 132. U.S. Census Bureau, Trade in Goods (Imports, Exports, and Trade 
Balance) with Canada, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c1220.html 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2007) [hereinafter U.S.C.B. Trade in Goods];  U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency, World Factbook-----United States, https://www.cia.gov/cia/ 
publications/factbook/geos/us.html#Econ (last visited Feb. 8, 2007). 
 133. StatsCan Trade Balance data, supra note 131.  In 2005, Canada’s trade 
surplus with the United States measured C$109 billion, which compensated for 
a C$44 billion deficit with the rest of the world.  Id.  Since 1989, when the 
CUSFTA was initiated, the U.S. trade deficit with Canada has expanded by 760 
percent from US$9.1 billion to US$78.4 billion in 2005.  U.S.C.B. Trade in 
Goods, supra note 132.  This somewhat exceeds overall growth in the U.S. trade 
deficit during this period of 670% from US$93.1 billion in 1989 to US$716.7 
billion in 2005.  U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Trade in Goods and Services − 
Balance of Payments (‘‘BOP’’) Basis (2006), http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/statistics/historical/gands.pdf. 
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Such a motivated, sovereign federal government is a ‘‘collective 
action’’ mechanism par excellence.  While the U.S. federal 
government possesses much greater resources overall than its 
Canadian counterpart, the structure of Chapter 19 (which treats all 
governments equally regardless of the size of their population or 
economy) has neutralized these advantages. 
Thus, whether or not the views of U.S. Chapter 19 panelists 
reflect any dissension between the U.S. executive and judicial 
branches, one would expect the government of Canada and its allied 
Canadian and U.S. industrial interests to attempt to capture the 
NAFTA process on an ongoing basis by exercising careful control 
over the appointment of Canadian panelists to ensure they support 
Canadian trade priorities generally and by seeking to influence the 
mindset of U.S. panelists by, for example, sponsoring seminars and 
speakers,134 paying for advertisements and op-ed pieces on the evils 
of U.S. trade laws, embassy receptions, press releases, hiring 
lawyers and public relations firms, supporting associations of U.S. 
importers, and the like.  This is really nothing more than the normal 
activities of trade officials and diplomats.  The U.S. government, 
however, is divided on trade issues and attaches relatively little 
importance to them compared with other foreign affairs priorities.  
The expected result would be that Canadian panelists exert 
disproportionate and one-sided influence in Chapter 19 adjudication. 
3. Ideological and Structural Features 
Ideology may also play a role.  A strong school in the United 
States has argued that U.S. trade laws are bad policy and should be 
abolished, as noted supra.135  This view cannot be solely the result of 
the diplomatic efforts of Canadian or other foreign governments.  It 
rather reflects a relatively strong belief in the United States that 
taxes generally are bad and government intervention in private 
transactions is suspect at best.136  In Canada, in contrast, there is a 
greater degree of comfort with government intervention in the 
 
 134. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
SPRING MEETING 2007 at 33 (Jan. 31, 2007) (announcing a panel on ‘‘Softwood 
Lumber Dispute Resolution, and the Rule of Law,’’ composed mainly of 
representatives of Canadian interests); ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, 
ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM 16 (Jan. 2007) (describing Canadian-sponsored field 
trip for U.S. law professors to the Canadian Embassy to discuss ‘‘trade issues’’). 
 135. See supra section IV. 
 136. See, e.g., Alan Wm. Wolff, On America’s National Commercial Interest, 
at 2-3 (Jan. 12, 1995), available at http://www.dbtrade.com/publications/ 
181929w.pdf. 
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economy and critiques of the Canadian trade laws are relatively 
rare. 
So, if many U.S. academics and lawyers believe that enactment 
of trade laws was a failure of the legislative system to produce the 
optimal result for the public good, it would not in a sense be 
surprising to find that U.S. panelists (usually academics or lawyers) 
may refuse to apply the law as legislated.  Indeed, a few 
commentators suggest that a benefit of international dispute 
settlement mechanisms is that they are opaque and confuse anti-
trade constituencies, so that legislators can pass laws that appease 
protectionist interests while expecting that adjudicators will not 
actually apply them.137 
Yet if so, this raises the question of why Chapter 19 panelists 
have been willing to discard the statutory standard of review in U.S. 
trade cases, while the U.S. judiciary has not.  It also raises the 
question of why U.S. panelists have not shown equal commitment to 
free trade when Canadian trade barriers are involved. 
In addition to the greater expected commitment by the 
Canadian government to influence the outcome of Chapter 19 cases 
discussed supra, a number of structural differences between judicial 
review and Chapter 19 review may help explain these disparities. 
First, Chapter 19 applies different bodies of law to each country 
involved instead of creating a single body of international law 
applicable to all adherents to the agreement.  This means that 
panels have no need to reconcile different standards and can treat 
nationals of different countries differently.  The application of 
national law increases the temptation for panelists to disregard the 
standard of review when it is law not adopted by their own 
 
 137. As stated by Professor Krauss, ‘‘Clearly, the Chapter 19 binational 
dispute resolution panels have given U.S. politicos a safety valve through which 
they can claim to have done all they could for their rent-seeking constituents, 
all the while not substantially damaging the trade process.’’  Krauss, supra note 
8, at 94.  In a similar vein, Professor Goldstein has warned that trade 
agreements ‘‘that involve[] highly precise and transparent rules can have the 
unintended effect of encouraging the mobilization of protectionist forces that see 
themselves as probable losers from an agreement.’’  Judith Goldstein & Lisa L. 
Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary 
Note, 54 INT’L ORG. 603, 606 (2000).  This view assumes a great deal of 
gullibility on the part of one’s domestic industries, i.e., that they will not realize 
that vague laws will be interpreted against them.  More likely, all parties are 
initially uncertain about how rules will be implemented but must accept this 
uncertainty as part of a compromise.  See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain 
of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333, 353 (1999) (discussing the 
difference between rules and standards in the WTO agreements).  The purpose 
of this Article is to examine how Chapter 19 has been implemented and draw 
lessons for future trade agreements. 
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legislatures nor even universal international law.  In contrast, 
judges have at least some tradition of deferring to the will of their 
national legislatures. 
Second, the Chapter 19 process imposes some particular hurdles 
to challenges by domestic industries to rulings by their own 
governments.  The governments choose the panelists.  Panelists that 
rule against their own government, in favor of a petitioner, risk 
becoming unpopular with both governments involved.  Similarly, 
only the governments can request an extraordinary challenge 
committee, so a petitioner that has lost a Chapter 19 challenge to its 
own government’s ruling lacks even a limited right of appeal.  Thus, 
panels know that any ruling against a petitioner’s appeal cannot be 
overturned. 
Third, the peremptory challenge138 process works in Canada’s 
favor.  This is because if the U.S. government challenges a Canadian 
panelist selection, Canada has no limits on its alternative choices, 
whereas U.S. law precludes the U.S. government from deviating 
from its own roster, which may be exhausted when many panels are 
active.139 
Fourth, CIT judges, and even more so CAFC judges, hear a 
broad range of cases covering a broad range of administrative law 
and agencies.  This makes them concerned with creating a 
consistent body of law, and precedents decided in one class of cases 
may be cited in others.  This may somewhat limit these courts’ 
ability to review one agency more intrusively than others.  Chapter 
19 panels, in contrast, do not need to fear that their decisions will 
have spillover effects in other areas of law and can seek to effectuate 
their own policy goals with less fear of unintended consequences in 
other legal fields. 
 
 138. See NAFTA, supra note 3, annex 1901.2(2) (providing that each party 
can exclude up to four panel candidates proposed by the other party). 
 139. Chapter 19 itself states that the governments ‘‘normally’’ must choose 
panelists from their rosters, but does not require this.  NAFTA, supra note 3, 
annex 1901.02(1).  The Canadian government does, at times, appoint panel 
members who have never appeared on a roster.  As noted supra, U.S. law 
provides that all candidates for appointment to Chapter 19 rosters of panels 
(other than federal judges of courts created under Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution) must undergo a process by which they are first appointed to 
preliminary candidate lists by a group of agency officials, and then the list is 
presented to selected congressional committees for review.  19 U.S.C. § 3432(c) 
(2000).  The U.S. Trade Representative then presents Congress with a final 
candidate list each year.  19 U.S.C. § 3432(c)(4).  Only persons who appeared on 
the appropriate final candidate list can sit on panels.  19 U.S.C. § 3432(d)(2)(A).  
Article III judges need not undergo this procedure, but the U.S. government has 
never appointed an Article III judge to a Chapter 19 panel, roster, or ECC. 
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Fifth, Chapter 19 panelists are primarily self-selected.  
Membership on a NAFTA panel carries little reward beyond the 
chance to influence the outcome of important cases.  Persons with a 
strong ideological commitment may be disproportionately attracted 
to this sort of employment.140 
CONCLUSION: POTENTIAL REFORMS TO CHAPTER 19 AND LESSONS FOR 
SUBSEQUENT INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS 
After more than seventeen years of operation, enough Chapter 
19 panels have issued decisions to allow definite conclusions about 
their application of U.S. and Canadian law.  This clearly shows two 
double standards at work: panels apply rigorous scrutiny to any U.S. 
agency decision that is challenged by Canadian exporters or 
governments, while allowing near-absolute deference to any U.S. 
agency decision that is challenged by U.S. industry (unless the 
agency admits it erred).  Neither standard resembles the one 
applied by the U.S. courts.  At the same time, Chapter 19 panels, 
like Canadian courts, have applied great deference to Canadian 
agency decisions, and when panels have disturbed Canadian 
decisions the intervention has been small and as likely to favor 
Canadian industry as importers. 
These disparities are not accounted for by the usual 
explanations: that Chapter 19 appeals present different fact 
patterns than other trade cases, that the U.S. courts are 
inexperienced or inept, or that U.S. domestic producers have 
‘‘captured’’ the U.S. agency process.  If anything, the circumstances 
should suggest that Chapter 19 panels would reverse fewer agency 
decisions than U.S. courts and be more favorable to U.S. industries; 
as agencies have become particularly careful in their application of 
trade remedies to Canadian imports, U.S. industries file fewer 
petitions and appeal far fewer decisions in cases involving Canada, 
and Canadian respondents are more apt to appeal than most. 
More likely, the disparate standards of review applied by 
Chapter 19 panels result from a combination of other factors: 
conflicting viewpoints within the U.S. government, a Canadian 
government highly motivated to implement its trade policies both on 
the import and export side, and structural factors that make 
 
 140. Ironically, the U.S. law implementing Chapter 19 requires the 
government to appoint judges ‘‘to the fullest extent practicable,’’ and requires 
periodic reports from USTR on its efforts to achieve this.  19 U.S.C. 
§§ 3432(a)(2), (h).  If federal judges were sitting on Chapter 19 panels, 
presumably the results would be more similar.  But no U.S. federal judge has 
ever sat on a Chapter 19 panel, and no report has been filed. 
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Chapter 19 panels more willing to disregard the outcome of the 
legislative process than courts. 
Whether all of this is a great success or a dismal failure depends 
on one’s point of view.  Most commentators take the former view.  
For the Canadian government, the outcome is certainly consistent 
with their objectives in accepting Chapter 19.  For the many U.S. 
academics who have hailed the results of the Chapter 19 process, 
and importing and consuming industries, the partial nullification of 
U.S. AD and CVD law is quite desirable, and few seem troubled by 
parallel Canadian trade laws. 
The implications for the future of international dispute 
settlement and trade negotiations, however, are potentially grave.  
The Chapter 19 process shows that international dispute settlement 
outcomes may not reflect the agreement’s text as approved by 
Congress or the Presidential statements that accompanied it.  This 
has likely made Congress less likely to approve such agreements.  
Despite initial hopes, NAFTA has not been extended to Chile, for 
example.141  Similarly, Chapter 19 operation, coupled with the WTO 
Appellate Body’s failure to apply the agreed-upon standards of 
review negotiated during the Uruguay Round,142 may have 
contributed to the United States’ refusal to consent to modifications 
to the WTO regime for trade remedy law, possibly contributing to 
the collapse of the Doha Round.143 
It could be possible to modify Chapter 19 or at least structure 
any future dispute settlement process to make it adhere somewhat 
more faithfully to the standard of review.  Reforms could include 
appointing judges to Chapter 19 panels, having panels of judges 
review Chapter 19 panels’ decisions for consistency, educating 
potential U.S. panelists on the U.S. constitutional system, requiring 
panelists to swear to abide by U.S. law, and creating a roster of U.S. 
panelists willing to serve essentially full-time.  None of these 
measures would require modifying either Chapter 19, which Canada 
 
 141. Allgeier Rules Out Expansion of NAFTA AD, CVD Panels, 19.20 INSIDE 
U.S. TRADE, May 18, 2001, at 1 (quoting Deputy USTR’s promise to the Senate 
not to extend Chapter 19 dispute settlement to Chile). 
 142. For a thorough explanation of the Appellate Body’s disregard of the 
Antidumping Agreement’s standard of review and its likely repercussions for 
the future of trade negotiations, see Daniel K. Tarullo, The Hidden Costs of 
International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping 
Decisions, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 109 (2002). 
 143. Abhijit Das, Need to Adopt a Cautious Approach, FIN. EXPRESS, Feb.  
8, 2006, http://www.financialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?content_id=116928 
(explaining the conflict between U.S. and export-oriented economies, such as 
Japan, Hong Kong, China, Chile, and Korea, over the latter’s desire to further 
curtail AD disciplines during the Doha Round of negotiations). 
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would presumably not accept, or even U.S. law.  On the other hand, 
they may not be terribly effective, either.  Probably the best way for 
Chapter 19 panels to instill greater confidence in the international 
dispute settlement system would be for the panels themselves to 
begin applying U.S. law accurately and consistently. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Analysis of Binational Panels’ Treatment of Petitioners’ 
versus Respondents’ Claims in Appeals of U.S. Agency 
Decisions 
1. Hypothesis Testing 
To verify whether NAFTA panels have treated petitioners and 
respondents similarly, we looked at all Chapter 19 decisions on 
claims by these parties.  To confirm or refute the general impression 
that NAFTA panels have been less inclined to favor petitioner 
claims than respondent claims, we examined all claims under the 
operational definition provided supra in Part II, more specifically in 
note 54.  The goal was to test the following research hypothesis: 
H1: NAFTA panels are less likely to favor petitioner claims than 
respondent claims 
The ‘‘null hypothesis’’ of no difference between NAFTA panel 
treatment of petitioner and respondent claims helps us test whether 
the absolute differences reported supra in Part II are in fact 
statistically significant.144 
2. Methodology 
We present the results in two formats: (a) interpretation of the 
data displayed in each table, and (b) inferential statistical analysis.  
As far as interpretation is concerned, tables are interpreted or read 
row-by-row from left to right.  ‘‘Petitioners’’ and ‘‘Respondents,’’ the 
two categorical groups compared in each column represent the only 
two possible variations of the independent variable, ‘‘Party 
Identification.’’  To monitor the differential impact of ‘‘Party 
Identification’’ on the dependent variable ‘‘Claim Outcome,’’ each row 
will display a separate possible outcome of claim adjudication: ‘‘Win’’ 
and ‘‘Loss.’’  Thus, as we allow the independent variable to vary, we 
can detect whether and how the dependent variable categories, 
displayed in each row, change based on their observed frequencies.145  
Empiricists will reminds us, however, that this is merely a non-
statistical method of evaluating the merits of our research 
hypotheses.  Given the format in which our data is organized, we 
 
 144. See HUBERT M. BLALOCK, JR., SOCIAL STATISTICS 156-58 (McGraw Hill) 
(1972). 
 145. However, to make the information in each cell comparable, each cell’s 
absolute frequency is normalized by dividing it by its column total. 
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use Fisher’s Exact Test to determine the existence of a relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables.146 
Fisher’s Exact Test also compares data from two dichotomous 
groups-----Petitioners and Respondents-----to see whether their 
different impact on the two categories of the dependent variable is 
statistically significant.147  Once we calculate a p value, we compare 
it with the level of statistical significance.148  If the calculated p 
value is less than this predetermined level, the null hypothesis is 
refuted and the research hypothesis is corroborated.149 
 
 146. While the χ2 test is the most frequently used method of inferential 
statistical testing for two-by-two contingency tables, it may not be valid when 
the expected frequency in any cell is less than five.  See THEODORE COLTON, 
STATISTICS IN MEDICINE 164-65 (1974).  Because one cell in Table 3 had an 
expected frequency of 5.79, see, infra, Appendix 1, and because Fisher’s Exact 
Test is ‘‘most useful . . . whenever the total sample size is moderate but one or 
more of the marginals [is] very small,’’ BLALOCK, supra note 144, at 291-----which 
is the case with the Chapter 19 part of that table-----we decided to submit the 
data reported in all tables to Fisher’s Exact Test.  This test also seemed 
appropriate in light of the fact that the χ2 test relies on a large sample 
approximation, which yields higher calculated values, thus making it easier to 
reject the null hypothesis of no association when actually it should not.  Id.  
Conversely, Fisher’s Exact Test gives a true calculated level of significance (‘‘p 
value’’) that is always smaller than the calculated p value that is reported in a χ2 
test.  C. Frank Starmer et al., Some Reasons for Not Using the Yates Continuity 
Correction on 2 x 2 Contingency Tables, 69 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 376, 376-78 (1974).  
Thus, by using this test, we choose to err on the conservative side.  The only 
drawback is that Fisher’s Exact Test has no formal test statistic or critical 
value, so we have to derive our conclusions from comparisons between 
calculated probability values, not from comparisons between calculated and 
critical values of a test statistic.  The positive trade-off is that, unlike χ2 
distribution, this test gives us exact rather than approximate p values.  See 
BLALOCK, supra note 144, at 287. 
 147. In operational terms, this test holds the observed marginal frequencies 
constant and calculates the probability of obtaining exactly the same observed 
cell frequencies and any configuration more skewed.  See id.  By ‘‘more skewed,’’ 
we mean any outcome, given the observed marginal frequencies, that is even 
less likely than the one obtained, either in the same direction (one-tailed) or in 
both directions (two-tailed).  Id. at 289.  Because each research hypothesis 
indicates the direction of the relationship and the test’s two tails are not 
perfectly symmetrical, we conduct one-tailed tests only.  See id. at 164. 
 148. The level of statistical significance represents our willingness to reject a 
particular hypothesis when it is actually true (type I error) so that we minimize 
the risk of erroneously accepting as true a hypothesis that is actually false (type 
II error).  See BLALOCK, supra note 144, at 158-59.  The level of statistical 
significance adopted for testing all hypotheses in this study is 0.001.  This 
means that there is a 1 in 1000 chance of being wrong in finding that dependent 
and independent variables are related when random chance could be the reason 
for their apparent relationship. 
 149. See id. at 156-58. 
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3. Empirical Results and Statistical Comparison of Petitioner and 
Respondent Claim Success in Chapter 19 Review 
a. Basic Petitioner and Respondent Claim Success and 
Failure Rates 
The table below shows the cell frequencies we observed for each 
category of the dependent variable (rows) and independent variable 
(columns):150 
 
Table 1: Claim Review Outcomes  
with Voluntary Remands 
 
  Party Identification  
  Petitioner Respondent Row Sum 
Win 19    27.54% 136    50.37% 155 Claim 
Outcome Loss 50        72.46% 134   49.63% 184 
Column Sum 69 270   n = 339 
 
Table 1’s first row shows that, in Chapter 19 adjudication, 
petitioners win about twenty-eight percent of their claims, while 
respondents succeeded fifty percent of the time.  Thus, in rounded 
figures, petitioners succeed in a little over one-quarter of their 
claims.  Yet, respondents succeed in about half of their claims.  
Table 1’s second row shows the same picture from a different 
perspective: petitioners lose in almost three out of every four claims, 
while respondents lose approximately half the time.  These results 
demonstrate that varying Party Identification impacts the likelihood 
of a claim’s success.  To be precise, NAFTA review is less likely to 
favor petitioner claims than respondent claims. 
To determine whether a statistically significant relationship 
exists between ‘‘Party Identification’’ and ‘‘Claim Outcome,’’ we 
performed Fisher’s Exact Test.  Fisher’s Exact Test requires 
evaluating the following probabilities: 
 
 150. Following the convention in the empirical literature, we placed ‘‘Party 
Identification,’’ the independent variable, on top of the table, while placing 
‘‘Claim Outcome,’’ the dependent variable, on the left-hand side.  The reader 
should note that because absolute totals for each category of the independent 
variable are not the same, we have calculated the ratio of each cell frequency 
with respect to its column total to make comparison possible. 
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These probabilities are based on the observed frequencies reported 
supra in the Table 1 and all other expected tables having the same 
marginal frequencies.  This test focuses only on those probabilities 
that are less than or equal to Pk (one-tailed test).  To obtain the 
calculated p value for each Fisher’s Exact Test, we added all these 
probabilities (i.e., Pk + Pk+1 + Pk+2 . . .).  We tested each research 
hypothesis by comparing the calculated value associated with the 
observed table with the prespecified level of statistical significance 
(p = 0.001).  If the calculated p value is less than or equal to the 
prespecified level, the null hypothesis of no relationship is refuted.  
The table below summarizes these steps. 
 
Table 2: Fisher's Exact Test Calculation 
     
Observed 
Frequencies Associated p value  
         
19 136  
50 134 
 
Pk + Pk+1 + Pk+2 . . . = 0.00046187 <      0.001 
   
   
(Level of statistical 
significance) 
 
Because we obtained a calculated p value (0.00046187) that is 
less than the prespecified level of statistical significance, we were 
able to corroborate the research hypothesis. 
b. Sensitivity of Results to Methodology Used to Count 
Petitioner and Respondent Claims 
Table 1’s figures may be sensitive to the overall impact of 
agency-requested voluntary remands.  Statistical testing of 
petitioner and respondent claim success and failure rates based on 
data that includes voluntary remands is troublesome because such 
remands are largely due to the agency itself having reconsidered its 
position, rather than a direct result of petitioner or respondent 
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requests.151  Counting claims that overlap with agency requests for 
voluntary remands blurs our perception of petitioner and 
respondent actual wins or losses on their claims.  Yet, the counting 
approach leading to Table 1 accepts all claims as they have been 
identified-----the claims are unfiltered.  Thus, Table 1’s observed 
frequencies not only fail to give a more accurate picture of the 
overall performance of respondent and petitioner claims, they may 
actually produce statistical results too sensitive to the effect of 
voluntary remands to be reliable. 
If we eliminate the voluntary remands, the difference in claim 
success between petitioners and respondents becomes even more 
striking, an indication that Table 1’s figures, though not entirely 
representative of the actual success rate, still point in the right 
direction.  Table 3 below shows the new observed frequencies: 
 
Table 3: Claim Review Outcomes  
Without Voluntary Remands 
 
  Party Identification  
  Petitioner Respondent Row Sum 
Win    3     5.66% 119    47.04% 122 Claim 
Outcome Loss    50       94.34% 134    52.96% 184 
Column Sum 53 253   n = 306 
 
 Again, the observed data shows that, in raw terms, petitioners 
are at least eight times less likely to prevail in their claims than 
respondents.  Conversely, row two demonstrates that petitioners 
lost more than ninety-four percent of the time, while respondents 
lost a little over half the time.  Indeed, the substantial decrease in 
the number of petitioner wins after removal of voluntary remands 
underscores just how their ‘‘success’’ at NAFTA depends on U.S. 
agency action.  These results not only confirm, but also strengthen 
the interpretation reached with respect to Table 1. 
More importantly, the new observed Table 3 frequencies yield 
an even lower calculated p value: 
 
 
 151. The fact that Chapter 19 panels have rarely rejected such agency 
requests supports this conclusion.  See discussion supra Part II, specifically note 
60. 
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Table 4: Fisher's Exact Test Calculation 
     
Observed 
Frequencies Associated p value  
         
3 119  
50 134 
 
Pk + Pk+1 + Pk+2 . . . = 0.00000001 <      0.001 
   
   
(Level of statistical 
significance) 
 
Again, because the calculated p value (0.00000001) is less than 
the prespecified level of statistical significance, we can reject the 
null hypothesis and confirm the research hypothesis that NAFTA 
review is less likely to favor petitioner claims than respondent 
claims. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Lists of Chapter 19 Case Outcomes 
 
1. NAFTA review has left the outcome unaffected in the following 
reviews of U.S. agency decisions: 
NAFTA, Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Wire Rod from Canada, 
at 31, USA-CDA-2002-1904-09 (Aug. 12, 2004) (final injury 
determination); NAFTA, Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat 
Products from Canada, at 41-42, USA-CDA-00-1904-11 (Oct. 19, 
2004) (AD/CVD Sunset Review); NAFTA, Circular Welded Non-Alloy 
Steel Pipe From Mexico, at 3, USA-98-1904-05 (Nov. 19, 2002) (final 
AD scope determination); NAFTA, Gray Portland Cement and 
Clinker from Mexico, at 1, 31, USA-97-1904-02 (Dec. 4, 1998) 
(Fourth AD Administrative Review); NAFTA, Corrosion-Resistant 
Carbon Steel Flat Products from Canada, at 14, USA-97-1904-03 
(June 4, 1998) (final AD determination); NAFTA, Gray Portland 
Cement and Clinker from Mexico, at 41, USA-95-1904-02 (Sept. 13, 
1996) (final AD determination); NAFTA, Color Picture Tubes from 
Canada, at 7, USA-95-1904-03 (May 6, 1996) (final AD 
determination); NAFTA, Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat 
Products from Canada, USA-93-1904-05 (Nov. 4, 1994) (final injury 
determination); NAFTA, Magnesium from Canada, at 31-32, USA-
92-1904-05/06 (Aug. 27, 1993) (final injury determination); NAFTA, 
Pure and Alloy Magnesium from Canada, USA-92-1904-03 (Aug. 16, 
1993) (final CVD determination); NAFTA, New Steel Rail, Except 
Light Rail, from Canada, USA-89-1904-08 (Aug. 30, 1990) (final AD 
determination); NAFTA, New Steel Rails from Canada, USA-89-
1904-09/10 (Aug. 13, 1990) (final injury determination); NAFTA, 
Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment 
from Canada, USA-89-1904-03 (Mar. 7, 1990) (final AD 
determination); NAFTA, Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled 
Bituminous Paving Equipment from Canada, USA-89-1904-02 (Jan. 
24, 1990) (final AD scope determination). 
2. NAFTA review has caused the rate to be reduced (or duties 
eliminated) in the following reviews of U.S. agency decisions: 
NAFTA, Certain Durum Wheat and Hard Red Spring Wheat 
from Canada, at 90-94, USA-CDA-2003-1904-05 (Mar. 10, 2005) 
(final CVD determination); NAFTA, Hard Red Spring Wheat from 
Canada, at 14, USA-CDA-2003-1904-06 (June 7, 2005) (final injury 
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determination); NAFTA, Certain Softwood Lumber Products from 
Canada, at 2-4, 7,  USA-CDA-2002-1904-07 (Aug. 31, 2004) (final 
injury determination); NAFTA, Pure Magnesium from Canada, at 
29, 31-33, USA-CDA-00-1904-06 (Mar. 27, 2002) (AD sunset review); 
NAFTA, Pure Magnesium and Alloy Magnesium from Canada, at 
30-31, USA-CDA-00-1904-07 (Mar. 27, 2002) (CVD sunset review); 
NAFTA, Gray Portland Cement and Clinker from Mexico, at 91-92, 
USA-MEX-99-1904-03 (May 30, 2002) (7th AD administrative 
review); NAFTA, Brass Sheet and Strip from Canada, at 2, 48, USA-
CDA-98-1904-03 (July 16, 1999) (AD administrative review); 
NAFTA, Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from 
Canada, at 31, USA-CDA-98-1904-01 (Mar. 20, 2001) (3rd 
administrative review); NAFTA, Grey Portland Cement and Clinker 
from Mexico, at 4-8, USA-97-1904-01 (June 18, 1999) (5th AD 
administrative review ); NAFTA, Fresh Cut Flowers from Mexico, at 
86-87, USA-95-1904-05 (Dec. 16, 1996) (final AD determination); 
NAFTA, Oil Country Tubular Goods from Mexico, at 99-100, USA-
95-1904-04 (July 31, 1996) (final AD determination); NAFTA, 
Porcelain-on-Steel Cookware from Mexico, at 60, USA-95-1904-01 
(Apr. 30, 1996) (5th administrative review); NAFTA, Leather 
Wearing Apparel from Mexico, at 1, USA-94-1904-02 (Oct. 20, 1995) 
(final CVD determination); NAFTA, Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon 
Steel Plate from Canada, at 53-54, USA-93-1904-04 (Oct. 31, 1994) 
(final AD determination); NAFTA, Pure and Alloy Magnesium from 
Canada, USA-92-1904-04 (Oct. 6, 1993) (final AD determination); 
NAFTA, Softwood Lumber from Canada, at 77-78, USA-92-1904-02 
(July 26, 1993) (final injury determination); NAFTA, Certain 
Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, USA-92-1904-01 (May 6, 
1993) (final CVD determination); NAFTA, Live Swine from Canada, 
USA-91-1904-04 (Aug. 26, 1992) (5th CVD administrative review); 
NAFTA, Live Swine from Canada, USA-91-1904-03 (May 19, 1992) 
(4th CVD administrative review); NAFTA, Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen 
Pork from Canada, USA-89-1904-11 (Jan. 22, 1991) (final injury 
determination); NAFTA, New Steel Rail, Except Light Rail, from 
Canada, at 18-21, USA-89-1904-07 (June 8, 1990) (final CVD 
determination); NAFTA, Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Pork from 
Canada, USA-89-1904-06 (Sept. 28, 1990) (final CVD 
determination); NAFTA, Red Raspberries from Canada, USA-89-
1904-01 (Dec. 15, 1989) (final AD determination). 
3. NAFTA review has left the outcome unaffected in the following 
reviews of Canadian agency decisions: 
NAFTA, Certain Iodinated Contrast Media Used for 
Radiographic Imaging, Originating in or Exported from the United 
States of America, at 21, CDA-USA-2000-1904-02 (Jan. 8, 2003) 
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(final injury determination.); NAFTA, Certain Iodinated Contrast 
Media Used for Radiographic Imaging, Originating in or Exported 
from the United States of America, at 17-18, CDA-USA-2000-1904-01 
(Jan. 8, 2003) (final AD determination.); NAFTA, Certain 
Refrigerators, Dishwashers and Dryers Originating in or Exported 
from the United States of America and Produced by, or on Behalf of, 
White Consolidated Industries, Inc. and Whirlpool Corporation, their 
Respective Affiliates, Successors and Assigns, at 35, CDA-USA-2000-
1904-04 (Jan. 16, 2002) (final injury determination); NAFTA, 
Certain Top-Mount Electric Refrigerators, Electric Household 
Dishwashers, and Gas or Electric Laundry Dryers, Originating in or 
Exported from the United States of America and Produced by, or on 
behalf of White Consolidated Industries, Inc. and Whirlpool 
Corporation, Their Respective Affiliates, Successors and Assigns, at 
49, CDA-USA-2000-1904-03 (Apr. 15, 2002) (final AD 
determination); NAFTA, Certain Cold-Reduced Flat Rolled Sheet 
Products of Carbon Steel (including high-strength low-alloy steel) 
Originating in or Exported from the United States of America, at 41, 
CDA-USA-98-1904-02 (July 19, 2000) (final injury determination); 
NAFTA, Certain Solder Joint Pressure Pipe Fittings and Solder 
Joint Drainage, Waste and Vent Pipe Fittings, Made of Cast Copper 
Alloy, Wrought Copper Alloy or Wrought Copper, Originating in or 
Exported from the United States of America and Produced by or on 
Behalf of Elkhart Products Corporation, Elkhart, Indiana, Nibco 
Inc., Elkhart, Indiana, and Mueller Industries, Inc., Wichita, 
Kansas, Their Successors and Assigns, at 26, CDA-USA-98-1904-03 
(Apr. 3, 2000) (AD sunset review); NAFTA, Certain Prepared Baby 
Food Originating in or Exported from the United States of America, 
at 15, CDA-USA-98-1904-01 (Nov. 17, 1999) (final injury 
determination); NAFTA, Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate, 
Originating in or Exported from Mexico, at 53-54, CDA-97-1904-02 
(May 19, 1999) (final injury determination); NAFTA, Certain 
Concrete Panels, Reinforced with Fiberglass Mesh, Originating in or 
Exported from the United States of America and Produced by or on 
Behalf of Custom Building Products, Its Successors and Assigns, for 
Use or Consumption in the Province of British Columbia or Alberta, 
at 25, CDA-97-1904-01 (Aug. 26, 1998) (final injury determination); 
NAFTA, Certain Malt Beverages from the United States of America, 
at 25, CDA-95-1904-01 (Nov. 15, 1995) (final injury determination); 
NAFTA, Certain Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sheet Products 
Originating in or Exported from the United States of America, at 24, 
CDA-94-1904-04 (July 10, 1995) (final injury determination); 
NAFTA, Synthetic Baler Twine With A Knot Strength Of 200 Lbs or 
less Originating in or Exported from the United States of America, at 
35, CDA-94-1904-02 (Apr. 10, 1995) (final injury determination); 
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NAFTA, Certain Solder Joint Pressure Pipe Fittings and Solder 
Joint Drainage, Waste and Vent Pipe Fittings, Made of Cast Copper 
Alloy, Wrought Copper Alloy or Wrought Copper, Originating in or 
Exported from the United States of America, at 25,  CDA-93-1904-11 
(Feb. 13, 1995) (final injury determination); NAFTA, Certain Cold-
Rolled Steel Sheet Originating in or Exported from the United States 
of America, at 76, CDA-93-1904-09 (July 13, 1994) (final injury 
determination); NAFTA, Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate and 
High-Strength Low-Alloy Plate, Heat-Treated or Not, Originating in 
or Exported from the U.S.A., at 49, CDA-93-1904-06 (Dec. 20, 1994) 
(final injury determination); NAFTA, Certain Beer Originating in or 
Exported from the United States of America by or on Behalf of G. 
Heileman Brewing Company Inc. and Pabst Brewing Company and 
the Stroh Brewery Company, Their Successors and Assigns, for Use 
or Consumption in the Province of British Columbia, at 33, CDA-91-
1904-02 (Aug. 26, 1992) (final injury determination); NAFTA, 
Certain Dumped Integral Horsepower Induction Motors, One 
Horsepower to Two Hundred Horsepower Inclusive, with Exceptions 
Originating in or Exported from the United States of America, at 72, 
CDA-90-1904-01 (Sept. 11, 1991) (final injury determination) 
4. NAFTA review has caused the rate to be changed in the 
following reviews of Canadian agency decisions: 
NAFTA, Final Determination of Dumping Regarding Certain 
Refined Sugar, Refined from Sugar Cane or Sugar Beets, in 
Granulated, Liquid and Powdered Form, Originating in or Exported 
from the United States of America, at 35-36, CDA-95-1904-04 (Oct. 9, 
1996) (final AD determination); NAFTA, Certain Corrosion 
Resistant Steel Sheet Products Originating in or Exported from the 
United States of America, at 1,9, CDA-94-1904-03 (Nov. 2, 1995) 
(final AD determination); NAFTA, The Final Determination of 
Dumping Made by the Deputy Minister of National Revenue, 
Customs and Excise, regarding Gypsum Board Originating in or 
Exported from the United States of America, at 30, CDA-93-1904-01 
(Nov. 17, 1993) (final AD determination); NAFTA, Final 
Determination of Dumping Regarding Certain Cold-Rolled Steel 
Sheet Originating in or Exported from the United States of America, 
at 58, CDA-93-1904-08 (June 14, 1994) (final AD determination); 
NAFTA, Final Determination of Dumping Made by Revenue 
Canada, Customs and Excise, Regarding Certain Machine Tufted 
Carpeting Originating in or Exported from the United States of 
America, at 39, CDA-92-1904-01 (May 19, 1993) (final AD 
determination); NAFTA, An Inquiry Made by the Canadian 
International Trade Tribunal Pursuant to Section 42 of the Special 
Imports Measures Act Respecting Machine Tufted Carpeting 
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Originating in or Exported from the United States of America, at 37-
38, CDA-92-1904-02 (Apr. 7, 1993) (final injury determination); 
NAFTA, Certain Beer Originating in or Exported from the United 
States of America by G. Heileman Brewing Company, Inc., Pabst 
Company, and the Stroh Brewery Company for Use or Consumption 
in the Province of British Columbia, at 73, CDA-91-1904-01 (Aug. 6, 
1992) (final AD determination). 
